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1ABSTRACT
The civil war in Syria has international repercussions due to the ongoing multi-sided character of the sectarian 
conflict and the involvement of all major global and regional powers. Despite the unending violence and the 
perpetuation of the Syrian inferno, little scholarly attention has been given to the intervention of the international 
community to mediate the war. The basic goal of this ebook is to fill this gap, at least partially, by examining the 
involvement of major international and regional actors in the Syrian crisis. Toward this end, the strategies and 
interventions of five states are examined: United States of America, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Lebanon. 
KEYWORDS 
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2INTRODUCTION
“In the Syrian civil war, 
the choice is often between 
bad and worse.”1
Ioannis Galariotis and Kostas Ifantis 
The Middle East has been in a state of collapse since 
the Arab Spring. A series of critical, complex and 
interrelated failures in security have resulted in chaos 
and bloodshed unprecedented even for a region 
with such a troubled past. While the demand for 
intervention has been high, the response has been very 
low. Almost a decade and a half after the United States 
(US) military campaign in Iraq, and six years after the 
celebrated Arab Spring, the evolving situation is met by 
a profound lack of appetite for a strategic response and 
regional engagement.2
Without doubt, the most violent, bloody and alarming 
case is that of the conflict in Syria. It is surprising that a 
country with close political, economic and diplomatic 
ties in the international system of states plunged into 
civil war. Until 2011, Syria, under the presidency of 
Bashar al-Assad, had been trying to reorganize its 
economy and dilute the old system of crony capitalism 
that had governed the country for the previous thirty 
years. Yet, the seeds of an upcoming catastrophe were 
evident long before the conflict broke out in March 
2011. Bashar al-Assad failed in his attempt to progress 
on key fronts: “fighting corruption and starting moves 
towards freedom, democracy, the rule of law and the 
dismantling of the security state”.3 Failure in these vital 
areas was enough to spread the epidemic of civil war.   
From the beginning of the conflict, it was evident 
that this crisis was too great to escape the interest 
and involvement of the international community. The 
1 Cockburn, P. (2017) “Who Supplies the News”, London 
Review of Books, vol.39, no.3, pp.7-9 (2 February 2017). 
2 See the collections of articles from The Independent: 
Fisk, R., Cockburn, P. and K.Sengupta (2016) History as It 
Happened: Syria: Descent into the Abyss (Miami: Mango Media, 
The Independent). 
3 McHugo, J. (2015) Syria: A Recent History (London: 
Saqi Books), p. 219.  
ongoing sectarian conflict has resulted in approximately 
470.000 deaths, 6.1 million internally displaced people, 
and 4.8 million seeking refuge abroad.4 Despite the 
unending violence and the perpetuation of the Syrian 
inferno, little scholarly attention has been given to the 
intervention of the international community to mediate 
the war. The aim of this collection of contributions from 
scholars who have expertise in Middle Eastern studies 
is to fill this gap, at least partially, by examining the 
involvement of major international and regional actors 
in the Syrian crisis. Toward this end, the strategies and 
interventions of five states are examined: US, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Lebanon.
In the next chapter, Kostas Ifantis and Ioannis 
Galariotis shed light on the US strategy in Syria and 
in the wider Middle East. They explain the failures 
of Obama’s vision to find a viable solution for the 
settlement of the conflict. Hanna Notte then examines 
Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war and how 
its military intervention, from September 2015, 
has been of revolutionary significance. In the third 
chapter, Neil Quilliam gives a sober evaluation of 
Saudi Arabia’s attitude towards Syria since the Arab 
Spring protests in 2011; he explains Saudi Arabia’s 
policy change from being a follower of Bashar al-
Assad to an ally of armed opposition groups aiming to 
overthrow the Syrian regime. In the contribution that 
follows, Kostas Ifantis and Ioannis Galariotis analyze 
Erdogan’s mistaken calculations, which led to Turkey’s 
unsuccessful engagement in the Syrian conflict from 
2011 onwards. Last but not least, Marina Calculli 
assesses the intervention of Hezbollah in the Syrian 
war; she provides new evidence to demonstrate that, 
contrary to received wisdom, Hezbollah is not going 
regional but is actually becoming politically stronger 
in Lebanon not just in spite of its intervention in Syria, 
but precisely through it.5
4 Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria: Events of 2016’, https://
www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/syria. 
5 The book stems from an international workshop held 
at the European University Institute in Florence on 16th of June 
2016. The workshop brought together all the contributors in this 
e-book. Ioannis Galariotis would like to thank Professor Ulrich 
Krotz and the ‘Europe in the World’ research group for their 
generous funding of this workshop. He would like also to thank 
the Max Weber Programme for its continuous support until the 
finalization of this publication. 
Introduction
Ioannis Galariotis and Kostas Ifantis
3Source: www.syria.liveuamap.com (accessed 4 June 2017)
4ON A POWER VACUUM 
AND RETREAT: THE 
OBAMA DOCTRINE IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
AND THE SYRIAN 
CRISIS 
Kostas Ifantis and Ioannis Galariotis 
Introduction
This paper argues that the United States (US) – the 
principal security actor in the Middle East – has 
demonstrated strategic anxiety bordering on inertia. 
Although President Obama did outline something 
akin to a Doctrine for American security engagement 
in the world, this has hardly been a proactive strategy 
designed to deal with the regional security collapse. 
It has been an approach profoundly lacking in a clear 
vision or a willingness to take on the regional security 
challenges. The result has been that Washington has 
been left without trusted partners or allies to work 
with. In the following pages, we first discuss the old 
security regime for the region and its transformation 
following the so-called Arab Spring; we go on to 
analyze US foreign policy priorities and preferences 
under Barack Obama, as well as its responses to the 
security issues in the region. 
The old anchors are no more…
The Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean have 
always been sensitive regions of strategic dynamics 
for diverse state as well as sub-state actors. The US has 
been molding a broad political and security strategy 
in the region since the end of the Second World War 
to maintain and safeguard the two-major regional 
triangular relationships: US-Turkey-Israel and US-
Egypt-Israel.1 In the case of the former, a strategic turn 
1 Alterman, Jon and Malka, Haim (2012) “Shifting 
Eastern Mediterranean Geometry”, The Washington Quarterly, 
Vol.35 No.3, p. 111.
took place when Turkey and Israel signed a military 
cooperation agreement in 1996. That agreement was 
perceived as a fundamental US-Turkish strategic bond, 
featuring the importance of Turkey as Israel’s partner 
in the Middle East. It also highlighted the strong 
support from the powerful Jewish lobby in Washington 
on issues that were important to Turkey, such as 
confronting the impact of the Armenian lobby and 
promoting in Congress Turkey’s demands for advanced 
military hardware.2 In the case of the latter, confronting 
Iran’s activism and combating terrorism are among the 
most vital interests shared by the three powers, the US, 
Egypt and Israel. These strategic priorities have defined 
US interests over the years, sustaining a stable regional 
balance of power and safeguarding the energy supply 
of the West.3 
Since the late 2000s, however, new political forces 
have come to the fore, eager to offer a substantial 
challenge to the strategic topography that the US had 
been striving to shape. The social turmoil of the Arab 
Spring was an attempt to establish a new regional order 
that was ready to trigger the relative predictability of 
the political preferences of the previous two decades. 
The setting in which the two triangular relationships 
had functioned was disrupted and the US found itself 
in profound difficulty because of the inability and 
incompetence of traditional partners to maintain the 
‘old’ regional order. Political disorder became the norm 
and not the exception to the rule.4 For instance, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict erupted once again, with 
episodes of violence in November 2012 and July 2014 
on the Gaza Strip. 
Turkey has always been an anchor for the strategic 
objectives of the US in the wider Middle East region. 
During the Cold War, it was a critical partner of the US5; 
in this respect, it was also significant in the promotion 
of US regional engagement policies in the Middle 
2 Aydin, Mustafa (2009) “Reconstructing Turkish-
American Relations: Divergences versus Convergences”, New 
Perspectives on Turkey, Vol.40, pp.134-135.
3 Ibid., p. 114.
4 “The Gaza Crisis: Will the ceasefire lead to peace?”, The 
Economist, 24 November 2012.
5 Friedman, George ‘Turkey’s Strategy’, Geopolitical 
Weekly, 17 April 2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/turkeys_
strategy/, p.2.
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5East6. However, over the last two decades US-Turkish 
relations have been riven by uncertainty, beginning 
with the end of the Cold War when Turkey became 
free of its fear of Russia. This outcome had significant 
consequences for the US-Turkish relationship: Turkey 
was free to sketch its own approach to policy, without 
US strategic dependence.7 A first sign of this new 
approach was its unwillingness to follow US plans in 
the 2003 military campaign against Iraq.8 
The leaders of AKP place the Islamic world very high 
on the agenda of Turkey’s foreign policy. Davutoglu’s 
doctrine was that Turkey must reestablish its historic 
and cultural connections with the Middle East, North 
Africa and Eurasia.9 In the case of the Middle East, this 
major foreign policy shift has been described as a ‘neo-
Ottoman’ platform,10 indicating that Turkey’s Ottoman 
heritage gives it some sort of historical responsibility 
toward the Middle East and a sense of exceptionalism 
in the region11. Since AKP’s advent to power in 2002, 
the nature of this exceptionalism has expressed another 
dimension: it has been strongly based on ethical 
concerns, a quest for a just and peaceful international 
political order and respect for international law, 
supporting human rights both at home and abroad.12 
Within such a changing foreign policy context, 
Washington and the West should not have expected 
6 Gerger, Fawaz A. (2013) “The Obama Approach to 
the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment?”, International 
Affairs, Vol.89 No.2, p. 317 and Global Relations Forum (GRF), 
Turkey-USA Partnership at the Dawn of a New Century, Task Force 
Report (2011), Istanbul, p.19.
7 Friedman, op.cit., p. 2.
8 Park, Bill (2003) “Strategic location, political 
dislocation: Turkey, The United States, and Northern Iraq”, Middle 
East Review of International Affairs, Vol.7 No.2, p. 9.
9 Murinson, Alexander (2006) “The Strategic Depth 
Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol.42 No.6, pp. 945-64.
10 Fradkin, Hillel and Libby, Lewis (2013) “Erdogan’s 
Grand Vision: Rise and Decline”, World Affairs Journal, http://
www.worldaffairsjournal.org/print/63552.
11 Han, Ahmet K. (2013) “Paradise Lost: A neoclassican 
Realist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy and the Case of 
Turkish-Syrian Relations”, in Raymond Hinnebusch and Ozlem 
Tur (eds) Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity 
(Farnham: Ashgate).
12 Aral, Berdal (2015) “Law, Ethics, and Justice in the 
Emerging International Order: A Study of Turkish Diplomacy 
under the AK Party Government (2002-2014)”, Insight Turkey, 
vol.17, no.3, p. 189.
that Turkey’s support was a given.13 Rather, a quest for 
more autonomy of action should have been expected 
on the part of Turkey.14 The uncertain future of Turkey’s 
democracy and the formulation of an assertive and 
diverse foreign policy under Erdogan have considerable 
implications for US interests in the Middle East.15 In 
this equation, Iran’s growing importance for Ankara, 
both as a source of natural gas and a new market for 
Turkey’s assertive export sector, cannot be ignored. 
In 2012, when Ankara refused to support economic 
sanctions against Tehran and identified Israel as part of 
a nuclear Iran problem, it seemed to keep its distance 
from the assessment of the Iranian nuclear program 
that was dominant in the West.16 In Syria, when the 
Turkish government approved military action17 in 
2012, it added further complexity to its relations with 
Washington by abandoning its status as a trusted 
regional ally.18 
Considering the above, both the US and Turkey, more 
than ever, have formed differing perceptions and 
diverging views over key policy choices and issues 
for the future security of the Middle East. Although 
Washington recognizes Turkey’s essential role in the 
region and its value in stabilizing US relations with 
the Muslim world19, the relationship has become 
more complex and sensitive as Turkey has distanced 
itself from traditional partners, such as Israel, and has 
pursued a more hegemonic role as an aspiring regional 
leader for the region. But regardless of the troubled US-
Turkish relationship, other developments have added 
to the complexity of the situation in the Middle East. 
13 Gerger, op.cit., p. 317.
14 Walberg, Eric (2011) “Turkey-Israel Relations and 
the Middle East Geopolitical Chessboard. Turkey redraws 
Sykes-Picot”, Global Research, 30 November 2011, http://www.
globalresearch.ca/turkey-israel-relations-and-the-middle-east-
geopolitical-chessboard/26867. 
15 Robins, Philip (2013) “Turkey’s “double gravity” 
predicament: The foreign policy of a newly activist power”, 
International Affairs, Vol.89 No.2, pp. 381-397.
16 Reynolds, Michael (2012) Echoes of Empire: Turkey’s 
Crisis of Kemalism and the Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy, 
The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, Analysis 
Paper No 26, June 2012 and Fradkin and Libby, op.cit. 
17 “Turkey’s Parliament Approves Further Military Action 
Against Syria”, The New York Times, October 4, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/middleeast/syria.html.
18 Zeyrek, Deniz “Turkey’s Syria Policy: Success or 
Bankruptcy?”, Radikal, 26 May 2013. 
19 Gerger, op.cit., p.316.
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6Israel’s neighbors have become more hostile. Once it 
could count on Egypt to contain Hamas, but Egypt’s 
domestic situation has undermined its regional status. 
In Lebanon, the Hezbollah party-cum-militia holds 
sway. Jordan’s King Abdullah has found himself under 
increasing political and economic pressure. Syria’s civil 
war has shattered the calm on the border with Israel; 
the war’s outcome is critical to the regional status quo.20 
In Iraq and Syria, the jihadist paramilitaries of ISIS 
have established a presence that threatens to redraw 
the regional map in ways hard to imagine. 
On the Arab Spring
The expression Arab Spring has been used to 
designate what appeared to be widespread uprisings 
against authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya and Syria.21 The label has proved to reflect 
wishful thinking rather than reality. The momentum 
of reform proved too weak and, although the degree 
of social mobilization was seen as unprecedented, 
the dynamics of democratization did not endure; the 
political and social prospect for change proved more 
of a chimera. Democratic advances proved fragile; 
democratic reform was, in most cases, suppressed 
with violence.22 Most of the actors involved have still 
to agree on even the fundamentals and they appear 
more unanimous about what they are against, which 
confirms the region’s historic lack of consensus on 
almost everything political. Distrust between different 
actors, both between and within states, is on the rise, 
making politics and identity even more fractured 
and polarized.23 The upheavals, whatever their initial 
inspiration, rapidly transformed into a regional 
sectarian struggle between Sunni and Shiite Muslims 
that has since been threatening to envelop the entire 
Middle East. In Syria, the conflict became a regional 
sectarian war where the divide between Sunnis and 
Shiites manifested itself with a vengeance.24
Muasher has identified three key dynamics at play.25 The 
20 “Old battles, new Middle East”, The Economist, 
November 24, 2012.
21 Dunsmore, Barrie (2013) “Mideast Arab Spring morphs 
into sectarian conflicts”, June 9, http://vtdigger.org/2013/06/09/
dunsmore-mideast-arab-spring-morphs-into-sectarian-
conflicts/#sthash.5s4KQU5K.dpuf. 
22 Youngs, R. (2014), From Transformation to Mediation: 
The Arab Spring Reframed, Carnegie Europe, p. 4.
23 Ibid., p. 5.
24 Dunsmore, Barrie op.cit. 
25 Muasher, Marwan (2013) “Year Four of the Arab 
first has been the metamorphosis of Islamic religious 
groups from opposition forces into political formations 
to be reckoned with in most countries experiencing 
political upheavals (i.e. Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and 
Yemen as well as in Egypt). The second factor stems 
from the two battles within political Islam: on the one 
hand between the offshoot movements of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafi groups and the other between 
Sunni and Shia. According to Muasher, “the first 
might determine to a great extent the future course 
of political Islam—whether it will be inclusionary 
or fundamentalist, peaceful or radical, reactionary 
or modern, or less clearly delineated.”26 The second 
struggle is also important because the tension between 
Sunnis and Shia has risen to such worrisome heights 
throughout the region (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Lebanon, and Syria). The last dynamic determining a 
war-prone state of play is the secular forces. They are 
not ready to accept the rise of Islamic regimes; only 
as far as democracy means they remain in power and 
their elite standing is not challenged.27
The process of the authoritarian bargain developed in 
the post-Arab Spring Middle East reveals that casting 
aside the old secular autocrats did not necessarily mean 
that these states were set on a path to democracy.28 
Rather, the process has lead to more fragmentation and 
war. In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, one more failure 
to reach a breakthrough in 2014, following the latest 
high-profile US effort, has demonstrated more than 
anything that traditional approaches are not working. 
Although the monarchies of the Arab world have, on 
the whole, not suffered this turmoil, they are by no 
means immune to the instability. In Syria, regional and 
internal dynamics have shifted in al-Assad’s favor as 
international concern over the growing role of Islamic 
fundamentalist groups in the opposition grew.29
Awakening”, Carnegie Endowment for `International Peace, 
December 12, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/12/year-
four-of-arab-awakening-pub-53905.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Dilek, Oguz (2015) “The Demise of the Authoritarian 
Bargain in the Arab Middle East”, Insight Turkey, vol.17, no.3, p. 
100.
29 Nasr, Vali (2013) “Back to the Future for US Policy In 
Egypt and Syria”, 31 July 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2013/07/back-to-future-for-us-policy-in-egypt-
and-syria.html?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=7893#ixzz2bxmjcGcG.
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Looking back to the Bush years (2001-2009), US foreign 
policy strategy was shaped by the neoconservative 
mantra that a militaristic and regime-change foreign 
policy could transform the Middle East. By the end 
of his second term, although his policy had been 
contradictory and ambivalent, President Obama 
managed to make considerable changes despite 
domestic challenges and limited resources. The basic 
tenet of his foreign policy strategy was based on a belief-
system situated within an “amalgam of pragmatism 
and Niebuhrian realism”30: namely, the promotion of 
international institutions and collective action, the 
co-existence of war and peace, universal values and 
practical geopolitics. Obama, in practice, strived to 
diminish the poor reputation US foreign policy had 
made for itself under the Bush administration.31 This 
was challenging, given the opposition that stemmed 
from the Republican Congress and that dealing with 
the global downturn both at home and abroad was 
imperative. The cumulative cost of the American 
response to 9/11 was estimated to at least 3.3 trillion 
dollars by 2011.32 
This foreign policy shift was built on a rethinking of 
multilateralism, by a leadership aware of the rise of 
countries like China, India and Brazil. For Obama, 
it was obvious that US power was limited in a new 
interdependent and ‘globalized’ international system 
and, for this reason, he chose to promote a cooperative 
strategy with both allies and non-allies to combat 
transnational threats.33 When he was reelected in 
November 2012, Obama sketched the major lines of his 
new foreign policy agenda: Europe and the Middle East 
were not a high priority; instead he turned the focus 
30 Milne, David (2012) ‘Pragmatism or what? The future of 
US foreign policy’, International Affairs, Vol.88 No.5, p. 939
31 Zakaria, Fareed, “The Strategist”, Time, January 30, 
2012, p. 16.
32 Sanger, David E.  (2012) Confront and Conceal: Obama’s 
secret wars and surprising use of American power (New York: 
Crown), p. 418.
33 Jones, Bruce (2009) “The Coming Clash? Europe 
and the US Multilateralism under Obama”, in Vasconcelos, A. 
and Zaborowski, M. (eds) The Obama Moment: European and 
American Perspectives, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 
p. 69 and Martin Indyk, Kenneth Liebethal and O’Hanlon, 
Michael E. (2012) “Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A progressive 
Pragmatist Tries to Bend History”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012.
towards the Asia-Pacific region.34 This new priority was 
reflected in the Defense Department’s January 2012 
“strategic guidance” document, which stated that, “US 
economic and security interests are inextricably linked 
to developments in the arc extending from the Western 
Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and 
South Asia”.35 Obama worked hard to end the military 
presence of the US in the Muslim world and relocate 
US visibility towards the Asia-Pacific region. The US 
troop presence in Afghanistan had been scheduled to 
be reduced at the end of 2014; Obama sought to keep 
a small number of US troops in Afghanistan beyond 
2014 to train Afghan security forces and conduct 
counterterrorism missions.36 
Despite this US strategic change in world affairs, the 
Middle East region is not one that should be disregarded. 
Ongoing conflicts and sectarian quagmires, such as 
those in Syria and Iraq, are striking reminders that 
the US cannot afford to ignore in its grand strategy 
around the world. However, from 2001 onwards, the 
US has followed a foreign policy path that proved to be 
immensely costly in blood and money. Coupled with 
the financial crisis in the summer of 2007, Obama’s 
world vision was substantially diminished. The result 
was a foreign policy setting that was insolvent and 
costly. Initially, Obama decreased to zero the US forces 
in Iraq, believing this was an expensive, unending 
mission. He also sought to minimize any cost in 
Afghanistan, maintaining some forces to the fight on 
counterterrorism, which he embraced with ferocity in 
Pakistan and Yemen. The Taliban resurgence, however, 
forced Washington to renege on Obama’s pledge to 
withdraw all US forces by the end of his term in January 
2017. In Syria, from the start, Obama maintained that 
the US could best protect its interests by staying out of 
the conflict as much as possible. For Obama, the danger 
to the US posed by the Assad regime did not warrant 
34 Steplak, Amir and Whitlark, Rachel (2012) “The Battle 
over America’s Foreign Policy Doctrine”, Survival, Vo.54 No.5, 
p.47 and Gerger, 2013, op. cit., p. 300.
35 “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 
Century Defense”, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_
Strategic_Guidance.pdf.  
36 Pace, Julie, “Obama Surprises Troops in Afghanistan”, 
25 May 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/25/obama-
surprises-troops_n_5389274.html.
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8direct military intervention.37 This position was been 
subjected to vociferous criticisms, even within his own 
administration.38
According to Kenneth Pollack,39 the US disengagement 
from Iraq was the most significant factor leading to 
the return of anarchy both there and in the region as 
a whole. It forced regional actors to interact without 
the context of the stabilizing security expectations the 
US presence had been providing for years. It elevated 
security dilemmas without the restraining effect of 
US power. Insecurity resulted in aggressive behavior 
and the reawakening of old power struggles between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis accelerated their 
involvement in Syria, as well as directly intervening in 
Yemen’s civil war against the Houthi minority, which 
they recognize as an Iranian proxy. For Pollack, Obama 
focused on addressing the threat of instability by 
containing the spillover rather than by addressing the 
symptoms, a rather weak response which in the end led 
to spillover from Syria into Iraq; domestic instability 
in Turkey, in Jordan and Lebanon then followed. The 
turmoil in Libya threatens Egypt, Mali and Tunisia, 
while civil wars across the region have turned into 
proxy wars between Iran on the one side and Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf states on the other.40 
As far as Iran is concerned, while Tehran had for 
years preferred to flex its muscles in a covert way, 
working at arm’s length with Hezbollah and Hamas as 
proxies, chaos in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and the rise of ISIS 
changed that posture.41 In Iraq, Iran is responsible for 
approximately 100,000 Iraqi fighters mobilized by Iraqi 
37 Goldberg, Jeffrey “The Obama Doctrine”, The 
Atlantic, April 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/.
38 Former US ambassador to Syria Robert Ford 
acknowledged that he resigned because he was no longer in a 
position where he felt he could defend American policy. He 
added that it was widely known that the State Department 
thought the US needed to give much more help to the Syrian 
opposition. Dunne, Michele “The Costs of US Restraint in Syria”, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 June 2014, http://
carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/09/costs-of-US-restraint-in-
syria-pub-55827. 
39 Pollack, Kenneth M.  (2016) “Fight or Flight: America’s 
choice in the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs, vol.95, no.2, p. 66.
40 Ibid., p. 67.
41 Spindle, Bill “Iran Flexes New Clout Beyond its 
Borders”, The Wall Street Journal, 6-8 March 2016.
Shia clerics. In Yemen, a Shiite movement overthrew 
the Yemeni President with the help of Iranian arms 
and money. In Syria, Iran aids the regime by arming 
and managing a fusion of paramilitary groups that 
include Hezbollah fighters and Shia militias from Iraq 
and Afghanistan known as Jaysh al-Shabi (the People’s 
Army).42 By contrast, Saudi Arabia regards “the Levant 
as ground zero in its struggle with Iran”.43 The anti-
Assad revolution in 2011 was seen in Riyadh as a 
geostrategic opportunity to alter the regional balance 
in Saudi Arabia’s favor. It was perceived as a chance to 
weaken Iran and at the same time to neutralize all al-
Qaeda elements in Syria.44 Beyond the sectarian nature 
of the Iran-Saudi struggle, in Syria Riyadh strives for 
an unchanging Sunni authoritarian regime that will be 
an ordinary partner and will render obsolete the old 
Iran-Hamas-Hezbollah axis.45
The criticisms lodged against Obama are, however, 
partially flawed and miss out on some important 
points. The argument that the Obama administration 
frittered away the victory in Iraq and that the 
withdrawal of American combat troops is responsible 
for the ISIS onslaught leaves much to be desired. As 
Christopher Layne has pointed out, it was the March 
2003 invasion and consequent occupation of Iraq that 
created the conditions for the emergence of ISIS. It 
was the—not unforeseen—unwillingness of the Iraqi 
Sunnis to accept their loss of political power to a Shia 
regime in Baghdad that laid the ground for Sunni 
militancy and insurgency. Moreover, it was the terms 
of the 2008 status of forces agreement negotiated by the 
Bush administration that had provided for the 2011 
withdrawal. Furthermore, while Obama had come 
to terms with the necessity to keep at least a residual 
American force in Iraq for several years, the then 
42 Ibid.
43 Wehrey, Frederic and Sadjadpour, K. “Elusive 
Equilibrium: America, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in a Changing 
Middle East”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 
22, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/22/elusive-
equilibrium-america-iran-and-saudi-arabia-in-changing-middle-
east-pub-55641. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Wehrey, Frederic “Gulf Calculations in the Syrian 
Conflict”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 
9, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/09/gulf-
calculations-in-syrian-conflict-pub-55865. 
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One could detect that the US strategy has been less than 
coherent in the Middle East. It is relatively easy to set 
objectives but it is extremely hard to decide on priorities 
and actions. Certainly, the US under Obama wanted to 
see an end to the humanitarian disaster in Syria and 
Iraq. It wanted Assad out of office. It doesn’t want al 
Qaeda-backed rebels as part of his replacement.47 It 
wanted to prevent an expanded conflict, which could 
be damaging to allies such as Turkey, Jordan and Israel. 
It doesn’t want to see Iran rising as the dominant actor 
in the region. It does not want a confrontation with 
Russia and in fact needs Russian cooperation to avoid 
a wider war. It is deeply important to understand that 
not all of these goals are achievable, because some of 
them are mutually exclusive. For instance, avoiding a 
confrontation with Russia and getting its cooperation 
to find a diplomatic solution, probably cannot be 
achieved if Washington insists that this is dependent 
on Assad quitting Syria.48
Faced with such strategic dilemmas, Obama did resist 
calls to step-up US military engagement in Syria and 
rejected the escalation of American involvement against 
ISIS by refusing to deploy ground forces.49 ISIS’ seizure 
of territory in Iraq and Syria in summer 2014 propelled 
US foreign and security policy debates to center stage 
again. It also brought to the fore the linkages between 
the situation in both countries. Again, strong voices 
in Washington started calling for a more muscular 
approach and a stepping up of American military 
engagement, pointing at Obama’s previous moderation 
as the main reason for the region’s problems and 
describing the menace posed by ISIS as an existential 
46 Layne, Christopher (2015) “Obama’s Missed 
Opportunity to Pivot away from the Middle East”, Insight Turkey, 
vol.17, no.3, p. 15.
47 Stevenson has noted that from mid-2012, the US has 
been very hesitant to supply the Syrian opposition, out of fear that 
jihadists would acquire dangerous weapons. For the US Pentagon, 
jihadist infiltration of Syria in general and armed anti-Assad 
groups in particular pose the risk of a Sunni regime heavily reliant 
or even controlled by al-Qaeda and other affiliates. See Stevenson, 
Jonathan (2014) “The Syrian Tragedy and Precedent”, Survival, 
vol.56, no.3, p. 123.   
48 Ibid. See, also Layne 2015; Wehrey 2014 and Goldberg 
2016. 
49 Layne 2015, p. 12. 
threat to the US.50 Again, Obama resisted these calls. 
He further stood his ground when, following Russia’s 
intervention, “the numerous residual Cold Warriors”51 
began beating the war drums in Washington. American 
forces were confined to training and intelligence and 
logistic support to the Iraqis, while using air power to 
strike ISIS.52
For Layne, a major mistake was Obama’s declaration 
that Assad had to “go”.53 This ignored the reality that 
US choices in the Middle East are between “awful and 
worse”, as the Egyptian case had made very clear where 
the vacuum created by Mubarak’s ousting was filled by 
radical Islamists, which none in the rest of the Middle 
East could live with (with the exception of Turkey’s 
AKP).54 Moreover, by drawing a red line, he raised 
the expectations of the anti-Assad forces that the US 
would eventually intervene on their behalf, thereby 
causing an intensification of the fighting.55 It is worth 
noting that the 2014 “red line” came after a critical 
juncture in August 2013 when a chemical weapons 
attack killed more than 1,400 Syrians.56 Although the 
White House was quick to signal a determination to 
proceed with air strikes, Obama’s final decision to 
defer to Congress on whether to retaliate made clear 
he was not willing to sanction a military intervention 
under any circumstances; he was prepared to finally 
break with what he called the “Washington playbook” 
of militarized foreign policy responses.57 
50 Among them, then Secretaries of State and Defence 
John Kerry and Chuch Hegel. Layne 2015, p. 12.
51 Ibid., p. 16.
52 Ibid., p. 16.
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Layne 2015 and Stevenson 2014. 
56 Stevenson 2014. 
57 According to Dunne, “the president’s reluctance to use 
military force in a preemptive way certainly played a major role 
in this decision; he was also, perhaps, hesitant to antagonize Iran 
on the cusp of what seemed to be promising talks on the country’s 
nuclear program”, Dunne, 2014, op. cit. According to Obama 
himself: “I’m very proud of this moment. The overwhelming 
weight of conventional wisdom and the machinery of our 
national-security apparatus had gone fairly far. The perception 
was that my credibility was at stake, that America’s credibility was 
at stake. And so for me to press the pause button at that moment, 
I knew, would cost me politically. And the fact that I was able to 
pull back from the immediate pressures and think through in my 
own mind what was in America’s interest, not only with respect 
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A diplomatic solution was found, with Russia as a 
supporter, based on the idea of the eventual removal of 
many chemical weapons. However, the second Geneva 
peace conference in January 2014 was not successful.58 
Meanwhile, during the spring 2014, the Assad regime 
regain military control due to the strong support 
of Iran and Hezbollah. Coupled with that, Russia’s 
military involvement further supported the existing 
regime; Obama had no other option but to seek a 
cooperative behavior with Russia and, consequently, to 
accommodate Putin’s interests and preferences in the 
Middle East. 
Obama’s 2014 call for Assad to go is a very large obstacle 
to a political settlement.59 It is more than certain that 
the Assad regime will fight to the end, while Russia 
and Iran will support it even more.60 In this respect, 
US policy has been severely trapped: on the one hand, 
a more decisive American action is not definite that it 
will win the war against the rebels; on the other hand, 
the American retreat has resulted to the empowerment 
of Assad, Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, while the 
opposition and its allies (including the US) are less 
powerful to determine the state of the conflict.
Conclusion
During the Obama years, most crises in the Middle 
East were faced with fear and unwillingness, and 
without committing US resources. The US strategy 
was determined on a case-by-case basis without much 
ideological preference or bias.61 One thing was certain: 
the US revealed less willingness to make an impact on 
the course of events. Could it have performed better? 
On balance, a more consistent US policy could have 
produced better results, provided consistency was 
possible, given the monumentally conflicting interests 
and preferences of regional sectarian state and non-
state rulers and political power struggles unleashed 
by the upheavals in 2011. American influence and the 
willingness to deploy hard military power had been 
limited in most cases. There has been a strategic failure 
to: contain parochial regional antagonism, civil war 
and jihadist insurgencies; to achieve a breakthrough 
to Syria but also with respect to our democracy, was as tough a 
decision as I’ve made – and I believe ultimately it was the right 
decision to make”, Goldberg 2016, op. cit. 
58  Dunne 2014. 
59  Layne 2015. 
60  Ibid., pp. 16-17.
61  Milne, 2012, op. cit., pp. 941-942.
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; to convince a hostile 
Congress of the imperative of the breakthrough in the 
Iran nuclear programme; to deal with a revisionist 
Turkey, with a resurging Russia and with an Egypt 
swinging from autocracy, to democracy, to political 
Islam, and back to autocracy within a few months.62 
Having to deal with all of the above at the same time, 
and to go beyond reacting to powerful crosscutting 
currents over a war-torn region, however, is beyond 
any strategy that can be devised in a meaningful 
way. Obama was left with one fundamental strategic 
pillar: to keep the US out of another irrational military 
engagement in Syria at a time when US economy was 
being eroded. Choosing not to fight a war does less 
damage to US credibility and international standing 
than always reaching first for a military response. For 
Obama there was no credibility in “dropping bombs on 
someone to prove you are willing to drop bombs on 
someone”.63 He had shown that he would not hesitate 
to use military force in defense of America’s direct 
interests, such as in the bin Laden raid or the drone 
strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but he would 
not use it when the risks of casualties are high and 
where those interests are less than critical.64 Iraq and 
Afghanistan, for a President who as a Senator opposed 
the campaigns, served as a constant reminder that, 
while it is hard for the US to maintain the international 
order, it is even harder to impose it in the arcane fault 
lines of the Middle East and Syria.
62  Dunne 2014; Layne 2015; Goldberg 2016; Sanger 2012; 
Stevenson 2014; Wehrey 2014. 
63  Goldberg, 2016, op. cit. 
64  Sanger, 2012, p. 364.
On a Power Vacuum and Retreat: The Obama Doctrine in the Middle East and the Syrian Crisis 
Kostas Ifantis and Ioannis Galariotis
11
STICKING WITH 
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EXPLAINING 
RUSSIA’S SUPPORT 
FOR THE ASSAD 
REGIME
Hanna Notte
Introduction
Over the past eighteen months, Russia has shown that 
it is a pivotal player in the Syrian civil war. Its military 
intervention since September 2015 has been a game-
changer. Especially over the second half of 2016, which 
witnessed renewed rapprochement with Ankara, 
continued close cooperation with Tehran and Russia’s 
assisting the Syrian regime in breaking the rebellion 
in Aleppo, Moscow has increasingly been able to set 
the terms of Syria diplomacy. Currently, Russia is not 
only co-sponsoring the Astana track and playing a 
dominating role at the Geneva talks, but is also often 
key arbiter on the Syrian ground, whether in recently 
forging a deal in Aleppo Province between Kurdish 
forces and the Assad regime, or overseeing evacuation 
arrangements from rebel-held neighborhoods in Homs 
Province. Yet, while Russia’s significant influence on 
developments in Syria has long been obvious to even 
the cursory observer, the underlying drivers of Russia’s 
strategy – security and ideological – are less clearly 
understood. Thus, Russian foreign policy decisions 
have routinely caught Western observers by surprise 
and perpetuated the idea that Russian actions are 
unpredictable at best, irrational at worst. 
It is true that analysts who focus on Russia are 
challenged by a lack of transparency, which obscures 
understanding of how specific foreign policy decisions 
are taken. However, much can be learnt about the 
Kremlin’s position on Syria by evaluating it in the 
context of Moscow’s perspective on a post-Arab Spring 
Middle East, the Russian regime’s domestic priorities, 
as well as its broader relationship with the West. This 
article will examine the key drivers of Russia’s Syria 
policy, distinguishing between Russian interests and 
perspectives as they relate to state order, geopolitics 
and status. The analysis will explain not only why 
Russia has been steadfast in its support for the Assad 
regime, but also why it has escalated its involvement at 
various points throughout the war. 
‘The more the Middle East 
gets unstable, the higher 
the risk of people with 
malicious purposes causing 
us trouble.’1 
First, a concern with “state order”, or regime stability, 
is essential to Russia’s view on the Syrian conflict. As 
things are seen from Moscow, none of the outside 
actors propagating regime change have a credible plan 
for ensuring the orderly survival of existing Syrian state 
institutions after Assad’s forced departure. Russia fears 
the collapse of institutions and concomitant spread 
of chaos, since it believes that instability will further 
strengthen radical Islamist factions and facilitate their 
spillover beyond Syria’s borders. This would pose a 
real security threat to the Russian Federation itself, if 
extremists move to the North Caucasus, other Russian 
regions or Central Asia. 
A fear of the above-outlined causal chain – the removal 
of strong leaders leads to state collapse, which leads to 
the rise of radical Islamist groups – has more broadly 
characterised Russia’s reaction to the ‘Arab Spring’. 
While the initial Russian response to events in Egypt 
and Tunisia was relatively low-key, Russian experts 
and diplomats voiced cautious concerns from the start. 
Following Muammar Gaddafi’s overthrow in Libya 
in October 2011, Moscow’s view of the ‘Arab Spring’ 
as a phenomenon that primarily strengthens Islamist 
extremism solidified. 
1  Sergey Lavrov, “Interview to Ekho Moskvy”, in “Russia 
warns Arab aftershocks may rattle North Caucasus”, RT, 2 March 
2011, available at: https://www.rt.com/politics/russia-arab-unrest-
caucasus/, accessed 23 March 2017.
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It is important to understand these concerns in their 
historical context: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
unrest among Russia’s indigenous Muslim populations 
in the North Caucasus transformed the Middle East 
into a potentially dangerous source of destabilization, 
given the transnational dynamics of Muslim solidarity. 
Today, Moscow’s insistence that transnational Islamist 
terrorism threatens the very integrity of the Syrian 
state echoes similar claims the Kremlin made during 
Russia’s Second Chechen War in the early 2000s2. At 
that time, Chechen separatism and terrorist attacks 
were perceived by the government as a possible source 
of spillover to other Russian regions. In an interview in 
2000, President Putin warned that “the essence of the 
situation in the North Caucasus and in Chechnya ... is 
the continuation of the collapse of the USSR. If we did 
not quickly do something to stop it, Russia as a state 
in its current form would cease to exist.... we would 
be facing… the Yugoslavization of Russia”3. Following 
the terrorist attacks of “9/11” and the October 2001 US 
invasion in Afghanistan, the Kremlin held weekly press 
conferences to support claims that Chechens had links 
to the Taliban and provided the largest contingent of 
al-Qaeda’s foreign legion in Afghanistan. The Second 
Chechen War was thus presented as a conflict mostly 
fuelled by outside forces. 
Equally, in Syria, Russia has described the armed 
opposition groups on the ground as foreign 
mercenaries supported by external players, who try to 
use the conflict in Syria to promote their own political 
goals. This has resulted in the reductionist Russian 
discourse of a binary struggle between Assad and 
the terrorists. As was the case with Chechnya, Russia 
has rejected any distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
opponents and has frequently called on the US to 
specify the location of any ‘moderate’ rebels in Syria. 
Both in Chechnya and Syria, Russia has claimed it is 
fighting a primarily terrorist threat, which raises not 
only the spectre of state disintegration, but also has a 
2 For a comparison of Russia’s perspective on the Second 
Chechen War and the Syrian civil war, see: Fiona Hill, ‘The Real 
Reason Putin Supports Assad’, Foreign Affairs (March 25, 2013); 
Hanna Notte, ‘Russia in Chechnya and Syria: Pursuit of Strategic 
Goals’, Middle East Policy Council, Volume XXIII, No. 1, Spring 
2016.      
3 Quoted in: Gevorkyan, N. Timakova, N. and Kolesnikov 
A., (2000) Ot pervogo litsa razgavory s Vladimirom Putinym 
(Moscow: Vagrius), pp.133-135.
transnational, indeed civilizational, dimension4.  
While it is important to acknowledge Russia’s bitter 
experience during the Chechen Wars as one key 
prism through which Moscow looks at Syria today, 
one still has to ask how well-founded the concerns 
with an Islamist “spillover” from Syria to Russia 
really are. Two weeks before the Russian military 
commenced airstrikes in Syria in September 2015, 
Vladimir Putin argued at the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) meeting in Dushanbe 
that “militants undergoing ideological indoctrination 
and military training by ISIS come from many nations 
around the world, including,…the Russian Federation, 
and  many former Soviet republics. And, of  course, 
we are concerned by  their possible return to  our 
territories”5. 
According to President Putin’s most recent remarks on 
the subject, up to 4,000 Russian citizens are fighting in 
terrorist formations in Syria, joined by an additional 
5,000 citizens from other post-Soviet republics6. Of 
course, such official numbers always need to be used 
with caution. But there is no question that Russia 
has been increasingly worried about ISIL’s influence 
in the North Caucasus, especially Dagestan. People 
pledging allegiance to ISIL have carried out a number 
of sometimes deadly strikes in Dagestan over the 
past year (and most recently in Moscow and Nizhny 
Novgorod7), though these have gone largely unnoticed 
in the Western press. The Federal Security Service 
(FSB) has reportedly thwarted a number of ISIL-
inspired attacks over the past months, both in Moscow 
4 Some authors have even drawn a parallel specifically 
between Russian military tactics used in the bombing of Grozny 
in 2000 and those in Aleppo in recent months, see: Mark Galeotti, 
‘Putin is playing by Grozny rules in Aleppo’, Foreign Policy 
(September 2016); Michael Kimmelman, ‘Berlin, 1945; Grozny, 
2000; Aleppo, 2016’, The New York Times (October 14, 2016).
5 Vladimir Putin, Speech at CSTO Collective Security Council 
session in Dushanbe (September 15, 2015), available at: http://en.kremlin.
ru/events/president/news/50291. 
6 ‘Putin Rasskazal O Chisle Voiushhih Na Storone 
Boevikov V Sirii Rossiian’, Gazeta (February 23, 2017), available 
at: https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/9721685.shtml. 
7 ‘Islamskoe gosudarstvo vzialo na sebia otvetstvennost’ 
za napadenie v Nizhnem Novgorode’, Kommersant (October 26, 
2016), available at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3126516 
and ‘Specsluzhby predotvratili krupnyj terakt v Moskve 8 
marta’, Izvestia (March 15, 2017), available at: http://izvestia.ru/
news/670625. 
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and St. Petersburg, but also outside large urban 
centres8. Counterterrorism operations  are conducted 
frequently in the North Caucasus, especially Dagestan, 
but also Ingushetia and even Kabardino-Balkaria. 
In light of these developments, according to a 2016 
opinion poll, fears amongst Russia’s population about 
growing unrest in that region are again  on the rise, 
after cautious optimism the year before9.
The Kremlin’s worries about radical Islamism and its 
repercussions extend beyond the North Caucasus. 
Russia has also been worried about an ISIL infiltration 
across the Afghan-Tajik border10. Throughout the 
past two years, Russia has continued to pledge help to 
Tajikistan’s military to counter terrorism, for instance 
by reinforcing Dushanbe’s military base by one 
hundred armored personnel carriers and battle tanks11. 
In early January, Moscow’s Ambassador to Dushanbe 
suggested that Russia was seeking to further expand 
its military presence in Tajikistan by renting the Ayni 
airbase12. Warnings about ISIL’s intention to build and 
consolidate its ‘Khorasan Province’, which includes 
Central Asia, have been voiced not only by the Tajik 
8  ‘V FSB zaiavili o predotvrashhenii teraktov v Ingushetii 
i Moskve’, Kavkaz Uzel (November 15, 2016), available at: 
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/292654/?utm_source=dlvr.
it&utm_medium=twitter and ‘Rossiiskie specsluzhby v 2016 
godu predotvratili 42 terakta’, Ria Novosti (December 13, 2016), 
available at: https://ria.ru/incidents/20161213/1483445190.html.
9  Levada Center, ‘Vospriiatie Situacii Na Severnom 
Kavkaze; Opros Proveden 22-25 Ianvaria 2016 Goda’ (February 
2016), available at: http://www.levada.ru/2016/02/16/vospriyatie-
situatsii-na-severnom-kavkaze/. 
10  For a recent statement, see Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s 
special representative for Afghanistan: ‘Zamir Kabulov: Situaciia 
v Afganistane nakaliaet obstanovku v Tadzhikistane’, news.
tj (September 13, 2016), available at: http://news.tj/ru/news/
tajikistan/security/20160913/230788.  
11  ‘Some 100 military units delivered to Russian military 
base in Tajikistan’, Tass,  (June 24, 2016), available at: http://tass.
ru/en/defense/881741. Some Western experts on Central Asia 
have criticised Moscow for using the ISIL threat narrative in 
Central Asia to increase its leverage over the republics and justify 
why they need to militarily and politically work closely with 
Russia, for instance see: Noah Tucker, ‘Islamic State messaging 
to Central Asians Migrant Workers in Russia’, CERIA Brief, No. 
6 (March 2015) and Edward Lemon, ‘Russia Sees IS as Reason to 
Boost Control in Central Asia’, Eurasianet (November 11, 2014), 
available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70866.
12  Kucera, J., ‘Russia Announces Intent to Establish Air 
Base in Tajikistan’, Eurasianet (January 2, 2017), available at: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/81826?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_
medium=twitter. 
leadership, but also from other regional heads, for 
instance Kyrgyzstan’s Almazbek Atambaev13.
Then, there is the daunting challenge of managing a 
big Central Asian migrant population at home, in 
Russia’s industrial cities, such as Moscow, Vladivostok 
or Tyumen. Most Central Asians are radicalized and 
lured into the Syrian jihad while working in Russia, 
rather than in their home countries14. Recruitment 
processes amongst those communities are difficult to 
study empirically, but there is evidence that people 
are approached on work sites, in gyms and unofficial 
mosques, which are often attended by migrants. In 
Moscow, for instance, even the widely reported and 
much celebrated opening of the Cathedral Mosque in 
September 2015 is unlikely to mitigate the shortage of 
official places for worship. Without local imams who 
speak their native language to turn to for guidance, 
many migrants participate in online devotional 
communities, where they often end up being targeted 
by extremist recruiters. 
Yet, as important as it is to understand these dynamics, 
the Islamist spillover concern is not the primary driver 
of Moscow’s strategy in the Syrian war. Extremists 
have been leaving the North Caucasus for Syria in 
significant numbers since the beginning of the civil war, 
yet Russia did not see the need for ‘counterterrorism’ 
airstrikes until September 201515. And then, it did 
not even primarily target ISIL on the ground. Instead, 
Moscow’s decision to escalate its involvement in Syria 
13  Ne grozi iuzhnomu frontu: Kak Rossiia namerena 
borot’sia s IG eshhe i v Srednei Azii’, Lenta, (October 20, 2015), 
available at: https://lenta.ru/articles/2015/10/20/khorasan/. 
According to recent analysis by the Jamestown Foundation, there 
is evidence that ISIL, under pressure in Iraq and Syria, is diverting 
some of its Tajik fighters to Afghanistan via Iran, see: E. Lemon: 
‘To Afghanistan Not Syria? Islamic State Diverts Tajik Fighters 
South’, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume, Vol. 14, Issue 35 (March 15, 
2017), available at: https://jamestown.org/program/afghanistan-
not-syria-islamic-state-diverts-tajik-fighters-south/.
14 Noah Tucker, ‘Central Asian Involvement in the 
Conflict in Syria and Iraq: Drivers and Responses’.
15 International Crisis Group, ‘The North Caucasus 
Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad?’ (March 2016). The 
report alleges that, up until the Sochi Olympics in early 2014, 
Russian officials did little to prevent radicalised Islamists from 
leaving for Syria. Instead, the overarching concern at that time 
was to keep the North Caucasus secure for the Sochi Games. The 
FSB only became worried about the outflow (and possible return) 
of extremists from mid-2014, tightening border and airport 
controls, etc.
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was prompted by the successes in early 2015 of those 
armed opposition groups, which threatened Russia’s 
core objective of Syrian regime survival. While Russian 
officials have tended to classify any armed opposition 
as ‘terrorist’, they have also argued that the foreign 
fighter threat directed at the Russian Federation itself 
emanates mostly from ISIL and Al-Qaeda affiliated 
groups. Unlike saving the Assad regime, fighting ISIL 
to preempt a ‘spillover’ has never been Russia’s main 
objective in Syria. Nonetheless, the bitter experience 
of the Chechen wars remains formative in shaping 
the Kremlin’s approach to counterterrorism, both 
domestically and in the Middle East. Russian fears 
about the repercussions of radical Islam are real. They 
are central to Russia’s own perceived vulnerability as a 
country located in a non-benign regional environment 
close to instability in the Middle East, with its own 
large Sunni Muslim population and history of terrorist 
attacks. The post-Soviet foreign fighter phenomenon, 
while not a decisive concern, is therefore still important 
to fully understand Russia’s motives in Syria. 
One should also note that the fear of Islamist spillover 
is only one element on a whole spectrum of Russian 
security concerns related to Syria. Russia’s strategy has 
been always carefully calibrated to prevent the Syrian 
conflict from escalating into a full-scale regional 
war with incalculable risks. To that end, the Kremlin 
has proved its readiness to engage in diplomatically 
innovative, militarily escalating, or indeed de-
escalating measures, depending on its specific need. 
For instance, in September 2013, the credible threat 
of a US military strike against the Assad regime, 
following the chemical weapons attack near Eastern 
Ghouta on August 21, was crucial in eliciting Russia’s 
readiness to work with the US and international 
partners towards the removal and destruction of Syria’s 
declared chemical weapons stockpile. At the time, 
some in Moscow worried US strikes could draw more 
regional actors into the conflict and ignite a larger war. 
A year ago, it then appeared that Russian concerns 
about Saudi Arabia and Turkey stepping up their direct 
military involvement partially prompted the decision 
in Moscow to publicly announce the withdrawal of 
most Russian military forces from Syria, though the 
actual extent of that withdrawal remained contested 
afterwards16. And most recently, Russia has engaged in 
both military and diplomatic efforts to prevent clashes 
between Turkish and Kurdish forces in Northern 
Syria, and remains highly alert to any possible military 
escalation pitting Israel against the Syrian regime and 
its ally Hezbollah17. While Russia’s overall strategy of 
supporting the Assad regime has been consistent, its 
desire to avoid outright regional war thus continues to 
prompt tactical adjustments to that strategy at crucial 
inflection points in the conflict.
‘We are not in the business 
of regime change.’18
Russia’s support for the Syrian regime has not just been 
driven by a fear of regional instability and Islamist 
spillover. Crucially, Moscow also claims it rejects calls 
for Assad’s departure as a matter of principle, and it is 
ready to thwart what it views as yet another Western 
attempt of imposing standards of political legitimacy 
on a sovereign state. Russia’s official rhetoric on the 
Syrian crisis, couched in the language of legality, has 
made constant references to past Western-backed 
foreign interventions in the broader Middle East as 
having violated international law, while the Kremlin 
stresses that its own involvement in the Syrian conflict 
was requested by the recognised government of the 
country, therefore representing an “intervention by 
invitation”19. Moscow’s grievances with what it views 
as Western-style ‘democracy promotion’ efforts have 
16 For an example of this argument, see: Vasily Kuznetsov, 
‘Vyvod nashego osnovnogo kontingenta iz Sirii napravlen na to, 
chtoby prostimulirovat’ Bashara Asada na vedenie peregovorov’ 
(March 17, 2016), available at: http://politcom.ru/20880.html.
17 In early March, Russia brokered a deal in which the 
Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) handed over 
villages near Manbij, in Aleppo Province, to the Syrian regime. 
Later in March, Israeli airstrikes near Palmyra, likely targeting 
weapons convoys intended for Hezbollah, prompted Syria to 
launch anti-aircraft missiles. Following the incident, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry summoned the Israeli Ambassador in Moscow 
for a reprimand, in what looked like an attempt to “mollify” Syria 
and Iran to diffuse tension.
18 Sergey Lavrov, ‘Interview to RT’ (21 December 2012), 
available at: https://www.rt.com/op-edge/lavrov-interview-syria-
iran-528/. 
19 Roy Allison, ‘Russia and the post-2014 international 
order: revisionism, Realpolitik and regime change’, Public Lecture, 
Russian and Eastern European Studies, School of Interdisciplinary 
Area Studies, University of Oxford (January 16, 2017).
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been a consistent theme throughout the post-‘9/11’ 
Global War on Terror, but have intensified over time. 
Viewing the Taliban as a threat to its own national 
security, Russia supported the October 2001 US-
led campaign in Afghanistan, but as Washington 
progressively adopted a narrative of state-building 
in the country, Russia became increasingly critical20. 
Russia was then opposed to the 2003 invasion in 
Iraq; yet once claims of weapons of mass destruction 
inside Iraq proved unfounded and the language of 
‘regime change’ figured more prominently in the US’ 
discourse on the war, Russia’s criticism grew even more 
intense. Further, it observed with utter dismay how the 
2011 intervention in Libya eventually led to regime 
change. Given the more recent political instability and 
strengthening of ISIL in the country, references to the 
‘Libyan experience’ feature prominently in the Russian 
discourse on Syria today. Finally, Russia expressed 
worries about possible US regime change intentions 
against Damascus already long before the outbreak 
of the Syria crisis in 2011. Whether it was President 
George W. Bush declaring Syria to be part of an ‘axis of 
evil’ in January 2002, or the US stepping up its criticism 
of the Assad regime following the assassination of Rafik 
Hariri in Beirut in February 2005 – Russia always made 
clear that it would not tolerate externally orchestrated 
regime change in Syria. Its current stance needs to be 
understood in this historical perspective.
While Moscow’s current support for Damascus needs 
to be understood in this historical perspective, it is a fear 
of contagion of democracy promotion efforts beyond 
the Middle East that lies at the core of its misgivings. 
Already during the Libya crisis, Lavrov argued that 
sowing a belief among people that ‘foreigners will 
help us’ overthrow the regime may be ‘contagious’, and 
could ‘spread to protesters in other countries of the 
region’ hoping for assistance from the international 
community, and that this would be ‘an invitation to 
a whole array of civil wars’21. Fears about a Western-
20 For an excellent discussion of Russian objections to 
perceived Western-orchestrated regime change and democracy 
promotion objectives, in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond, see: Roy 
Allison (2013) Russia, the West, and Military Intervention (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press).
21 Sergey Lavrov at a press conference in Tskhinvali 
(April 26, 2011), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Former 
Soviet Union; quoted in: Roy Allison, (2013) ‘Russia and Syria: 
Explaining Alignment With A Regime In Crisis’, International 
backed regime change dynamic spreading like a virus 
ultimately betray the Russian regime’s paranoia about 
‘colour revolutions’ in the post-Soviet space, which 
Russia perceives as its legitimate sphere of influence. 
Moscow’s reaction to the popular uprisings in Georgia, 
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan between 2003 and 2005, when 
the Kremlin staunchly alleged these had been staged by 
the West, are a case in point.
Its fear of ‘colour revolutions’ in the post-Soviet space 
aside, adopting an uncompromising stance on the 
unfolding Syrian crisis has in the final instance also been 
critical for the Kremlin’s power consolidation at home. 
President Putin’s anti-Western outlook since 2011, 
which has underpinned Russia’s increasingly illiberal 
conception of democracy and assisted the President’s 
efforts to retain highly centralized control, has shaped 
Russia’s rhetoric on the Syrian war. That rhetoric, in 
turn has served Kremlin propaganda, emphasizing the 
West’s moral corruption and securitizing the Syrian 
crisis as a fight of existential importance. 
First, as the Russian regime has adopted an increasingly 
anti-Western outlook in recent years, it has promulgated 
a ‘clash of values’ between Western decadence and 
moral decay on the one hand, and Russian protection 
of tradition and conservative values on the other. The 
Russian Orthodox Church, an increasingly powerful 
lobby on the Kremlin’s foreign policy, has echoed 
this anti-Western rhetoric, which has served neatly 
to support the Kremlin’s narrative on the Syrian war: 
Russia has been portrayed as a bulwark of stability and 
a guarantor of national identities and state order in the 
Middle East. It has also been depicted as the only major 
power that is truly serious about fighting the threat 
posed by ISIL. In his much-anticipated September 
2015 remarks to the UN General Assembly, President 
Putin proposed an ‘anti-Hitler’-type coalition to fight 
ISIL22. Russian officials keep referencing this speech to 
this day, in order to express their disappointment that 
Western states have not yet joined such a coalition. 
Secondly, the Russian discourse has securitized the 
Syrian crisis as a fight of existential importance. As 
argued in the preceding section, the conflict in Syria has 
Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4.
22  Vladimir Putin, ‘Address to the 70th Session of the 
UN General Assembly’ (September 28, 2015), available at: http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50385.
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been essentially reduced to a struggle between Assad 
and the terrorists, the civilised and the barbarians of 
ISIL. In perpetually producing narratives of external 
threats that Russia needs to stand up against – the 
fascists in Ukraine, international terrorism in Syria 
– the Kremlin has preoccupied the public mind and 
diverted attention from pressing domestic problems23. 
And by imbuing Russia’s campaigns abroad with the 
importance of a higher moral order, the official narrative 
has additionally given the domestic populace a sense of 
pride and urgency, intended to fuel patriotism. 
In this context, since the Ukrainian threat narrative 
had to some extent run its course by mid-2015 and the 
war there was seen as protracting without significant 
results, some analysts argued that the start of Russian 
airstrikes in Syria also came in handy to ensure 
continued popular mobilization24. There are limits 
to this argument, though, because it appears that 
the Syria campaign has been less relevant to regime 
consolidation purposes, than the annexation of Crimea 
or the conflict in Eastern Ukraine have been. In early 
October last year, when Russians were polled regarding 
their support for the use of Russian troops in Syria, 
only 47% voiced approval, while 33% expressed clear 
reservations25. At the end of the day, Syria is not part of 
Putin’s ‘Russkiy mir’26. And the involvement in a Middle 
Eastern country evoked fears of a ‘second Afghanistan’ 
among almost half of the respondents polled just after 
airstrikes began27. The regime therefore had to give 
23 Andrey Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Moscow Center 
comments on how the Russian state is using constant war for 
popular mobilization: “A constant war waged in the name of peace 
and running in the background. This is what the Russian ruling 
class needs to preserve itself … The goal of maintaining power 
requires that the show must go on... Once set in motion with 
Crimea, Donbass, or Syria, the machine cannot stop.” Andrey 
Kolesnikov, ‘A Background War’, Vedomosti (October 22, 2015), 
available at http://carnegie.ru/2015/10/22/background-war-
pub-61689.
24 See for instance: Jeffrey Mankoff, ‘A Syrian Sleight 
of Hand — To Deescalate in Donbass, Putin Moves to the 
Mediterranean,’ Foreign Affairs (October 13, 2015).
25 Levada-Center survey, which took place between 2-5 
October 2015 (“Do you support the Federation Council’s decision 
to allow the use of Russian troops abroad?”), available at: http://
www.levada.ru/eng/russian-participation-syrian-conflict. 
26  “Russkiy mir” is Russian for “Russian world”.
27  Levada-Center survey, which took place between 
23-26 October 2015 (“In your opinion, is it possible that Russian 
military involvement in the Syrian conflict could escalate into a 
clear assurances that there would be no ground troops 
deployed to Syria. While Russian casualties in Syria are 
presently limited to 28 in the official account, which 
is low especially if compared to Iranian, Turkish or 
Hezbollah losses, the use of private military contractors 
and casualties among their ranks remain staunchly 
denied by the Kremlin, which is mindful of possible 
public reactions to mounting Russian deaths in combat 
abroad28.  Since polls on domestic attitudes towards 
the military operation in Syria have not changed much 
over the past year, with support still hovering around 
just 50 percent29, popular mobilization over the Syria 
campaign will remain more limited than enthusiasm 
over Russian involvement in Crimea or the Donbass, 
and the Kremlin understands this well.
‘Without Bashar, there will 
be no Russia in the Middle 
East.’30
Leaving aside Russian security concerns which, as 
argued, range from Islamist spillover to regional war to 
colour revolutions in post-Soviet countries, there are 
also more sober geopolitical interests at stake in Syria. 
For Russia, its relationship with the Assad regime 
represents the core of its regional post-Soviet presence 
and provides the sole remaining basis from which power 
can be projected. Developments in recent months have 
clearly confirmed that Moscow has both the desire and 
ability to expand power-projection capabilities in the 
Middle East. In military terms, Russia has launched 
attacks in Syria from the Caspian Sea, submarines, the 
Iranian Hamadan base, its Black Sea Fleet and its only 
“New Afghanistan” for Russia?), available at: http://www.levada.
ru/en/2015/11/06/russian-participation-in-the-syrian-military-
conflict/. 
28  P. Felgenhauer, ‘Private Military Companies Forming 
Vanguard Of Russian Foreign Operations’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
Vol. 14, Issue 36 (March 16, 2017), available at: https://jamestown.
org/program/private-military-companies-forming-vanguard-
russian-foreign-operations/ and ‘Oni srazhalis’ za Siriiu - Kto na 
samom dele voiuet v Arabskoi Respublike’, Kommersant (March 9, 
2017), available at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3237004.
29  “Siriiiskii Konflikt”, Levada Center Poll (October 31, 
2016), available at: http://www.levada.ru/2016/10/31/sirijskij-
konflikt/. 
30  Alexei Malashenko, ‘Ne budet Bashara — ne budet na 
Blizhnem Vostoke Rossii’, Carnegie Moscow Center (March 23, 
2016), available at: http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=63192. 
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aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. Substantial 
military hardware has been deployed to Syria, including 
the S-400 and S-300, an oscillating number of fighter 
aircraft, tanks, submarines, destroyers and surveillance 
and reconnaissance aircraft31.
Meanwhile, against the backdrop of renewed Russian-
Turkish diplomacy on Syria last summer, the Russian 
press wrote that Turkey might provide its Incirlik 
base, which hosts NATO, for Russian operations in 
Syria. The Iraqi prime minister proceeded to grant 
the Russians conditional permission for using Iraqi 
airspace, while former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah 
Saleh invited them to use Yemeni airbases in the fight 
against terrorism. More recently, after it was passed by 
the State Duma, President Putin signed a federal law 
confirming Russia’s indefinite deployment of forces at 
Hmeymim and started talks with Egypt to restore the 
old Soviet air base in Sidi Barrani on the Mediterranean 
coast. As far as ‘projecting power’ goes, Moscow has 
upped the ante in the region. 
Russia’s desire to display its leverage credibly must be 
understood in the context of its broader relationship 
with the United States (US), which remains of crucial 
importance to Moscow: While Russia’s military 
escalation in Syria in September 2015 was undoubtedly 
prompted by the perceived need to prop up an Assad 
regime which was at this point losing territory, an 
additional motivation was likely to change facts on 
the ground in a way that would force the US to engage 
Russia more actively in diplomacy. Moscow, it appears, 
was quite keen to prevent a further worsening in 
Russia-West relations at the time. It believed the Syrian 
crisis could be instrumentalised to create conditions 
in which Moscow and Washington had to talk to each 
other again. 
Moscow defined this as a desirable objective because 
– despite its often hostile, anti-Western rhetoric – 
Russia is not interested in a sustained crisis with the 
West. The idea that Russia would use airstrikes in Syria 
31 For a detailed overview of Russia’s military deployment 
to Syria until mid-2016, see: ‘The Syrian Frontier’ (available only 
in Russian), Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies 
(2016), available at: http://cast.ru/upload/iblock/686/6864bf9d44
85b9cd83cc3614575e646a.pdf. Following the latest Russia-Turkey 
negotiated ceasefire in Syria, Moscow announced in early January 
2017 its intent to withdraw its aircraft carrier from Syria and scale 
down its military presence.
to pursue an improvement in relations with the US 
might sound outlandish to Western observers, but it 
was frequently articulated within the Moscow expert 
community at the time. Whether the Kremlin hoped 
that a ‘thaw’ in Russia-West relations would yield more 
concrete benefits - a settlement of the Ukraine crisis on 
terms acceptable to Russia, or the lifting of sanctions 
– is a matter of speculation. But it is plausible to argue 
that a general desire to prevent Russia-West relations 
from unravelling further has been a supporting driver 
of Russia’s constant call for cooperation over Syria. 
Moscow’s relentless demands for joint action with 
Washington, especially counterterrorism cooperation, 
show how valuable the perception of an equal 
partnership with the White House is for the Kremlin.
‘The Middle East is a way 
to showcase that the period 
of Russia’s absence from 
the international scene 
as a first-rate state has 
ended.’32
The Russian desire to play a key role in mediating the 
Syrian war on equal terms with Washington highlights 
a final driver of its strategy: the importance it attaches to 
international ‘status’. While even Realists admit that all 
states care about status (Robert Gilpin called ‘prestige’ 
the ‘everyday currency of international politics’), 
post-Soviet Russia seems to do so disproportionately. 
Though Russia lost its superpower status with the end 
of the Cold War, successive Russian elites refused to 
accept that their country had therefore become a 
lesser power. The status literature suggests that states, 
which are eager to defend or gain status and respect 
internationally, either imitate or compete with more 
respected powers33.
In escalating its role in the Syrian war in a carefully 
calibrated way, Russia has forced the US and other 
players to accept it as an indispensable mediator of 
32 Fyodor Lukyanov, quoted in: Yaroslav Trofimov, 
‘Russia’s Long Road To The Middle East’, The Wall Street Journal 
(May 27, 2016).
33 D. W. Larson and A. Shevchenko, ‘Russia says no: 
Power, status, and emotions in foreign policy’, in Heller, R. (et. al.), 
“Special issue: “Russia and Emotions in Russian Foreign Policy”, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (October 2014).
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the conflict, and as a force to be reckoned with in 
the wider region. The Russian play has clearly served 
its quest for status recognition, especially since it 
has allowed the Kremlin to showcase Russia’s latest 
military prowess, which is considered an important 
status marker in international politics. If one adds 
Russia’s grandstanding rhetoric about ‘carrying the 
torch in the fight against international terrorism’ to 
the picture, it seems clear that Russia’s involvement 
in Syria has betrayed the desire to project a certain 
image, domestically and internationally. Few episodes 
illustrate this as vividly as the Kremlin’s staging of a 
triumphal concert in Palmyra earlier last year, after 
Russia-backed forces had recaptured the site from ISIL.
Conclusion
Having looked at the key drivers of Russia’s Syria policy, 
what informed guesses can we make about future 
developments and what are the important questions 
we should be asking going forward?
Given its central concern with the protection of Syrian 
state order – both as a warning shot against regime 
change intentions in post-Soviet countries and as an 
insurance policy against Islamist spillover from the 
Middle East – Russia will continue to take any necessary 
steps to ensure the survival of Syrian state institutions 
against perceived outside meddling. If one reflects on 
the range of actions Russia has undertaken throughout 
this civil war – from working with the US on Syrian 
chemical weapons demilitarization, to launching 
airstrikes in Syria, to navigating a carefully calibrated 
course mediating between staunchly opposed actors, 
whether the Turks and the Kurds, or Israel and 
Hezbollah – Moscow has been diplomatically savvy 
and militarily shrewd in pursuit of its goals. There is 
nothing to suggest that Russian ingenuity has reached 
its limits.
That being said, Russia’s pro-regime agenda remains 
calibrated to pursue narrow goals. While it is vital that 
the regime does not succumb to external pressure, 
Moscow is not committed to enable Assad to retake 
all of Syria. To that extent, Russian interests are not 
aligned with those of its partner Iran, whose support 
for the ruling Assad dynasty has been driven by its 
desire to retain its regional influence and access to its 
chain of defense comprising Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and 
Yemen. Russia has never been concerned with Bashar 
Assad’s grip to power personally, instead protecting 
the remnants of Syrian state institutions, and has 
wanted the Syrian leader to be just about flexible 
enough for a diplomatic process to remain alive. As 
long as there is a political track, Russia will be central 
to it and Russia will be talked about. This is essential 
to Russia reclaiming status in the Middle East and the 
international community more broadly. 
Yet, it is still early to tell what role the Syrian war is 
playing in Russia’s larger geopolitical game: Are 
we entering a period in which the Middle East 
ceases to conveniently serve as a bargaining chip in 
Russia’s relationship with the West, but is acquiring 
a qualitatively new level of strategic significance for 
Moscow? Certainly, its growing military involvement 
in Syria has created opportunities for Moscow to build 
more robust commercial relationships with other 
Middle Eastern players, at a time when its gambit of 
forcing Washington into cooperation appeared to 
not be paying off. At the same time, Russia’s Foreign 
Ministry has used its growing clout in the region to 
step up mediation efforts in other theatres, signaling 
interest in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and, 
above all, the Libyan crisis34. And as a product of the 
US relative disengagement from Syria throughout the 
presidential transition, Russia’s assistance in breaking 
the rebellion in Aleppo, as well as its subsequent co-
sponsorship of the Astana process, the Kremlin has put 
itself firmly into the driving seat of Syria diplomacy. 
Yet, while Russia appears increasingly able to dominate 
the Astana and Geneva tracks at the expense of the 
US, Moscow will likely remain interested in closer 
cooperation on Syria with the Trump Administration, 
while not ceding the initiative or escalation dominance 
to the US government. Since the Pentagon recently 
reinforced its Marines deployment near Manbij 
and will be involved in the recapture of Raqqa from 
ISIL, Russian-US coordination will remain essential, 
if only to avoid incidents. Whether cooperation 
exceeding mere military coordination will be possible 
is something that Russia is still waiting to see, but 
remains open to35.
34 General Khalifa Haftar, the commander of Libya’s 
armed forces loyal to the country’s Tobruk-based government, 
visited Moscow several times throughout the last months for 
high-level consultations.    
35 ‘Lavrov: otnosheniia Moskvy i Vashingtona nahodiatsia 
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Beyond Syria, does Russia hold an independent ‘vision’ 
for a regional security order? In his appearance at the 
latest Valdai Club meeting in October, President Putin 
called for a ‘kind of Marshall Plan’ for the Middle East36, 
while representatives of Moscow’s expert community 
advocate for Russian mediation between the GCC 
and Iran37. Whether such intentions are actionable 
depends not just on President Trump’s policies towards 
the Middle East, or the economic means the Russian 
Federation will be able to exert, but also on whether 
regional players are receptive to Russia playing the role 
it envisions. How these trends will play out remains, 
at present, in the realm of speculation. What seems 
certain, for now, is that Moscow’s Syria policy will 
remain carefully calibrated to further what is Russia’s 
understanding of state order in the Middle East and, by 
extension, the post-Soviet space.
v rezhime “pauzy v ozhidanii”’, Tass (March 23, 2017), available at: 
http://tass.ru/politika/4118537?utm_source=twitter.com&utm_
medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_social_share. 
36 ‘Vladimir Putin Meets With Members of the Valdai 
Discussion Club. Transcript of the Plenary Session of the 
13th Annual Meeting’ (October 27, 2016), available at: http://
valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/vladimir-putin-took-part-in-
the-valdai-discussion-club-s-plenary-session/. 
37 A. Aksenenok, ‘Russia-GCC Relations After The 
Signing Of The JCPOA With Iran’, Russian International Affairs 
Council (March 15, 2017), available at: http://russiancouncil.ru/
en/inner/?id_4=8819#top-content.
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SAUDI ARABIA’S 
SYRIA POLICY
Neil Quilliam 
Introduction
Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Syria since the Arab 
spring protests in 2011 has undergone several key 
changes. What started out as a policy of accommodation 
intended to persuade Syrian president Bashar al-Assad 
to desist crushing protests and instead introduce 
reforms, turned into one that corralled the armed 
opposition groups into an effective fighting force intent 
on overthrowing the Syrian regime.
The kingdom’s Syria policy underwent a transformation 
between 2011-16. The drivers of the policy remained 
the same, which were to prevent contagion from the 
Arab spring reaching the Gulf Arab states, except 
Bahrain, and checking Iranian influence in the region. 
Nevertheless, the tactics employed to achieve those 
goals evolved over time and included the following: 
encouraging Assad to reform; lending qualified 
support to the Muslim Brotherhood dominated Syrian 
National Council (SNC); playing a dominant role in 
the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces (SOC); arming the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA); supporting the Islamic Front; pledging to 
send troops to fight in Syria; and hosting Syrian armed 
groups in December 2015.
This article aims to better understand Saudi Arabia’s 
policy towards Syria since 2011 and to account for 
the changes that have taken place. By doing so, it will 
examine the domestic, regional and international 
factors that have shaped Saudi policy. Furthermore, it 
will highlight the key events that precipitated a radical 
change in policy.
Although Saudi Arabia possesses formal institutions, 
a bureaucratic process, think tanks and universities 
to support policy formulation, decision-making in 
the kingdom remains highly personalized. The king 
in Saudi Arabia is the ultimate decision-maker and 
during the final years of King Abdullah’s reign, critical 
decisions were often held-up for days or even weeks, 
whilst he suffered poor health. As such, most analysis 
of Saudi policy, whilst taking into account structural 
factors, is attributed to the final decision-maker. This 
also applied to Abdullah’s policy towards Syria, which 
was also highly personalized and often based on the 
status of his personal relationship with the Syrian 
leader.
The second factor that has come to dominate Saudi 
policy is its regional competition with Iran. Whilst 
the relationship warmed during the Khatami years 
(1997-2005), the two countries have competed against 
one another for influence throughout the region since 
the Iranian revolution in 1979. Both countries appear 
to view the region as a chequer board and see their 
relations in zero-sum terms. In keeping with this 
perspective, Saudi influence in the region has suffered 
a number of setbacks since the United States (US)-led 
war on Iraq in 2003, notably, ‘losing’ Iraq to Iran. The 
kingdom’s policy towards Syria, therefore, has also 
been viewed as part of a zero-sum game and a piece on 
the chequer board that its leadership would like to rest 
from Iran’s influence. 
The third factor that has come to shape Saudi Arabia’s 
foreign policy has been its approach to the success 
of the Muslim Brotherhood and other jihadi groups. 
Following its painful experience of ‘blowback’ 
from exporting its discontents and malcontents to 
Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Saudi ruling family 
has grown increasingly wary of Islamist groups that 
operate outside its immediate sphere of influence. 
Thus, in its policy towards Syria, it has tried to bring 
Islamist groups operating there under its influence.
Saudi Arabia’s policy towards supporting Islamist 
groups in Syria has differed markedly from Qatar and 
Turkey, both of which have lent considerable financial 
and material support to groups too extreme for Saudi 
consideration. The following sections analyse how the 
factors that have shaped Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy 
apply to the Syria conflict and focus on domestic, 
regional and international considerations.
Domestic factors
Historically, the pattern of Saudi-Syrian relations had 
always ebbed and flowed. Former Syrian president 
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Hafez al-Assad made a fateful decision to support 
Iran in its eight year war with Iraq (1980-88) based on 
national interest and counter-balancing Iraq’s threat 
to the regional order. In effect, it pitted Syria against 
Iraq’s main regional backers, the Gulf Arab states, 
including Saudi Arabia. However, al-Assad’s decision 
to join the US-led coalition to liberate Kuwait from 
Iraqi occupation in 1990-91 proved pivotal in restoring 
relations between Damascus and Riyadh and provided 
the latter with the chance to ‘peel away’ Syria from 
Iran’s orbit.1
When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father as Syrian 
president in 2000, the then Saudi crown prince 
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud effectively took him 
under his patrimonial wing and offered the young 
leader support. Again, it presented Saudi Arabia with 
an opportunity to pull Syria away from Iran and more 
towards its own sphere of influence. If one were to 
fast forward to 14 February 2005 – nearly two years 
after the US-led war on Iraq, which saw Saudi Arabia’s 
influence in its neighbor severely curtailed, then the 
assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq 
Hariri would become the biggest obstacle ever to 
restoring Saudi-Syrian relations.2 
King Abdullah held the Syrian regime accountable 
for the assassination of Hariri, who had been Saudi 
Arabia’s key client in Lebanon. Not only had Hariri 
developed successful businesses in Saudi Arabia under 
the patronage of key members of the ruling family, but 
he had also been responsible for helping reconstruct 
Lebanon following the signing of the Taif Accords, 
which finally brought the Lebanese civil war to a close 
in 1989. Hariri had played a key role in regenerating 
aspects of the Lebanese economy, building a strong 
political constituency and ensuring that Saudi 
Arabia was an influential actor in the country.3 His 
assassination, therefore, posed a direct threat to Saudi 
interests in Lebanon and soured relations between 
King Abdullah and al-Assad.4 
1 N. Quilliam (1997) Syria and the New World Order 
(Reading: Ithaca Press), p. 160.
2 A. L. Butters, “A Rapprochement Between Syria and 
Saudi Arabia?”, Time, 8 October 2009, available at http://content.
time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1929072,00.html, accessed 14 
December 2016.
3 “Rafik Hariri: Symbol of Lebanon’s Reconstruction”, 
Arab News, 15 February 2005, available at http://www.arabnews.
com/node/262392, accessed 14 December 2016.
4 N. Partrick (ed) (2016) “Saudi Arabia’s Relations with 
Assad added insult to injury when in 2006, following 
the Israel-Hizbullah conflict, which lasted for 34 days, 
he called Abdullah a ‘half-man’ for not supporting 
Lebanon during the conflict or calling for a ceasefire.5 
At the time of the conflict, Assad’s ally, Hizbullah 
leader Hassan Nasrallah was arguably the most popular 
leader in the Arab world and dwarfed his counterparts 
in the Gulf Arab states.6 Hizbullah’s military ‘success’, 
which amounted to resisting Israel’s military for 34 
days emboldened Assad and further strengthened his 
relations not only with Hizbullah but also Iran, which 
has proven critical to his survival since the outbreak of 
the protests in 2011.
Against this backdrop of troubled relations, the 
patrician Abdullah did his utmost to dissuade Assad 
from violently suppressing the protests when they 
first broke out in March 2011. Abdullah’s decision to 
almost forget the past and forge a new relationship 
with Assad was based on two key factors: heading off 
the prospect of an Arab spring in Saudi Arabia, which 
could find fertile ground in the Shia-dominated and 
oil rich Eastern Province and also in traditionally 
more conservative cities, such as Qassim; and the 
opportunity to once again persuade Assad to leave the 
Iran axis of power. In essence, Abdullah was willing to 
give Assad one last chance and did so when the Syrian 
regime cracked down on protestors and attempted to 
transform what amounted to a reform movement into 
an armed struggle.7 
The advent of the Arab spring posed a challenge to the 
governance models of the Gulf Arab states and in the 
early days of growing protests in the region it evoked 
a series of different responses. In most cases, the Gulf 
Syria and Lebanon”, in Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and 
Cooperation, (London: IB Tauris), p. 210.
5 F. Wehrey, T.Karasic, A.Nader, J.Ghez, L.Hansell and 
R.Guffey  (2009) Saudi-Iranian Relations since the Fall of Saddam: 
Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy, (Santa 
Monica: Rand), p. 89, available at http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG840.pdf, accessed 
14 December 2016.
6 S. Wikas, “The Damascus-Hizballah Axis: Bashar al-
Asad’s Vision of a New Middle East”, The Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, Policywatch 1142, 29 August 2006, available 
at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/
the-damascus-hizballah-axis-bashar-al-asads-vision-of-a-new-
middle-east, accessed 14 December 2016.
7 J. Logan, “Analysis: Saudi Switch against Syria’s Assad 
Is Blow to Iran”, Reuters, 9 August 2011, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-saudi-syria-idUSTRE7781QS20110809, 
accessed 14 December 2016.
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Arab governments increased public spending, raised 
public sector salaries and offered their populations 
generous financial incentives to remain quiescent.8 For 
the most part, this approach worked, though protests in 
Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province led to a 
robust response from the security forces. Indeed, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait 
intervened militarily in Bahrain to secure the position 
of the ruling family. However, the intervention was 
more aimed at securing the al-Khalifa and preventing 
Iran from extending its direct influence over Saudi 
Arabia’s neighbour.9 
Abdullah sent his son Abdulaziz bin Abdullah al–
Saud, the then deputy minister of foreign affairs, 
on three occasions to meet with Assad and counsel 
strongly against the use of force to quell the protests. 
His motivation for sending a prominent emissary was 
not only aimed at averting unnecessary bloodshed, but 
also at encouraging protestors to seek peaceful means 
to achieve their goals. 
Abdullah’s motivation for sending his son to meet 
directly with Assad was intended, therefore, to prevent 
further contagion of the Arab spring and, at the same 
time, offset Iranian influence over the Syrian leader. 
However, Assad refused on all three occasions to meet 
with Abdulaziz and host the king’s son. Consequently, 
Abdullah took the diplomatic snub very personally 
and finally lost patience with the Syrian president – 
snubbing his son was the proverbial straw that broke 
the camel’s back and led the Saudi monarch to work 
towards undermining and overthrowing Assad.10  
On 8 August 2011, Abdullah made a public declaration 
‘What is happening in Syria is not acceptable for 
Saudi Arabia’ and he urged Assad to stop his ‘killing 
machine.’11 He withdrew his ambassador to Syria 
– a move that was quickly followed by Kuwait and 
Bahrain.12 
8 S. al-Atiqi, “Labouring against Themselves”, 23 
February 2013, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/
sada/51044?lang=en, accessed 14 December 2016.
9 E. Bronner, and M. Slackman, “Saudi Troops Enter 
Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest”, The New York Times, 15 
March 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/
world/middleeast/15bahrain.html, accessed 14 December 2016.
10 C. Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in 
the New Middle East, (London: Yale University Press, 2016), p. 69.
11 C. Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in 
the New Middle East, (London: Yale University Press, 2016), p. 69.
12 N. Bakri, “3 Arab Countries Recall Ambassadors to 
Saudi Arabia’s change in policy was precipitated 
by personal insult and animosity; and Abdullah – 
according to sources close to the king at the time – 
became not only determined, but also near obsessed 
with forcing Assad to move aside. The decision 
to withdraw support from the Syrian regime and 
bolster the Syrian political opposition, however, was 
also predicated on the kingdom’s loss of influence to 
Iran throughout the region. Iran’s predominance in 
Iraq, Hizbullah’s intransigence in Lebanon and now 
its support of an Alawi-dominated regime cracking 
down on a predominantly Sunni majority population 
heightened Abdullah’s sense of political impotence.
Although the succession in Saudi Arabia in January 
2015 brought with it considerable change and saw the 
promotion of next generation leaders to the positions 
of crown prince and deputy crown prince, it did not 
lead to a major change in Syria policy. Saudi support 
for rebel groups has continued; however, Syria, as a 
priority issue has dropped since the kingdom engaged 
directly in the conflict in neighbouring Yemen. 
Winning the war in Yemen has become the priority of 
the Saudi leadership, especially deputy crown prince 
Muhammed bin Salman, who has inadvertently staked 
his reputation on it.13
Regional factors
There is strong evidence to support the view that 
Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Syria was shaped by 
the regional environment. Since 1979, as mentioned 
before, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been locked 
into a wide-ranging regional struggle for influence. 
Prior to 1990, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states 
supported and relied upon Iraq to counterbalance the 
military and economic weight of Iran. The diminution 
of Iraq’s power projection after the 1990-91 war had 
a profound impact on Saudi Arabia’s security, which 
made it increasingly dependent upon the US and to a 
lesser extent European powers, France and the United 
Kingdom.
Syria”, The New York Times, 8 August 2011, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/world/middleeast/09syria.html, 
accessed 15 December 2016.
13 B. Law, “The Most Dangerous Man in the World?”, The 
Independent, 8 January 2016, available at http://www.independent.
co.uk/voices/the-most-dangerous-man-in-the-world-a6803191.
html, accessed 15 December 2016.
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The equivocal response of the US towards Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak during the Arab spring 
protests in Tahrir Square in January 2011, which 
eventually led to his removal from office was a major 
cause for concern for the Saudi ruling family. The 
al-Saud questioned the reliability of the US, given 
that the country’s security rested under its umbrella, 
and US President Barack Obama had just wavered in 
his support for a long-time ally. Abdullah and those 
around him questioned whether the US would come 
to the assistance of the Saudi ruling family should Arab 
spring protests take root in the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia’s heightened sense of vulnerability was 
compounded by the seeming success of Iran’s policy 
towards the region and Obama’s clear intention to 
reach an accommodation over a nuclear deal with 
Iran. Iran appeared to be in the ascendant and held the 
prospect of reintegrating into the global economy in 
its hands.14 
Iran’s apparent success in the region served to further 
frustrate Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to check its advances 
and led the Gulf Arab state to view its competition as 
a zero sum game. This was made clear to the author 
during several visits to the kingdom between 2012-15 
in a series of meetings with national security officials. 
At the same time, the success of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and the election of Muhammed 
Morsi to the presidency in June 2012 posed another 
threat to Saudi Arabia – both domestically and within 
the region. Abdullah viewed the Muslim Brotherhood 
with deep suspicion and along with the UAE sought to 
outlaw it at home and thwart its political advances in 
Arab spring countries.15
The combination of a zero-sum game with Iran 
and the perceived growing threat from the Muslim 
Brotherhood sharpened Saudi Arabia’s response in 
Syria. Abdullah appointed in July 2012 Prince Bandar 
14 C. Lee and M. Stancati, “Obama’s Mideast Mission: 
Get Saudis, Iran to Make Nice”, The Wall Street Journal, 19 April 
2016, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/obamas-mideast-
mission-get-saudis-iran-to-make-nice-1461111595, accessed 14 
December 2016.
15 S. Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood 
Predicament”, The Washington Post, 20 March 2014, available 
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/
wp/2014/03/20/saudi-arabias-muslim-brotherhood-predicament/, 
accessed 15 December 2016.
bin Sultan al-Saud as Director General of the Saudi 
Arabian Intelligence Agency, who took over the Syria 
file from Abdulaziz bin Abdullah al-Saud. Bandar 
brought with him a much more muscular approach to 
the Syria policy and immediately set out to arm rebel 
groups, some of which were closely allied al-Qaida 
linked groups and ISIS.16
In conversation with the author, Saudi security officials 
noted in late 2013 – following the coup in Egypt, 
which deposed Morsi, that ‘we lost Iraq, we lost Egypt, 
but have it back, we are not going to lose Syria.’ The 
sentiment expressed a change in policy shaped by 
threat perceptions in the region emanating from Iran 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Saudi Arabia was also deeply suspicious of Turkey 
and Qatar’s approach of working with the Muslim 
Brotherhood both in Syria and the Arab spring states, 
so took a more active role in managing and supplying 
both moderate and Islamist armed rebel factions, as 
a means of exerting influence over their activities. 
Concomitantly, relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar soured to the extent that they backed competing 
factions within the Syrian political opposition.17
International factors
The international environment affected Saudi Arabia’s 
Syria policy in several ways. First, Obama’s call for 
Assad to stand aside in August 2011, alongside US 
interventions in Iraq and Libya, caused many among the 
Syrian opposition to believe American intervention in 
the conflict would eventually come. These hopes were 
boosted when Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia all told 
their Syrian allies at various times that, ‘intervention is 
coming’.18
However, Obama himself was skeptical of such action, 
having opposed George W. Bush’s Middle Eastern 
adventures and seen the chaos that engulfed post-
Gaddafi Libya after he was persuaded to intervene 
there. Yet he did little to dispel these misconceptions. 
16  C. Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in 
the New Middle East (London: Yale University Press, 2016), p. 122.
17  K. Oweis, “Saudi-Qatar Rivalry Divides 
Syrian Opposition”, Reuters, 15 January 2014, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-qatar-
idUSBREA0E1G720140115, accessed 15 December 2016.
18 Author’s interview with Basma Kodmani, August 2015.
Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy
Neil Quilliam
24
He used hawkish language against Assad, stating on 20 
August 2012, ‘that a red line for us is we start seeing a 
whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or 
being utilized.’19
With his red line seemingly crossed with impunity 
Obama came under significant pressure to act, yet he 
was torn. On the one hand, he wanted to punish Assad 
and preserve the international norm against chemical 
weapons use, especially after the US explicitly warned 
against it. On the other hand, despite approving a 
modest CIA program to sponsor select rebel fighters 
in June 201420, he was unconvinced that either the 
political or the armed opposition could provide a 
viable moderate alternative to Assad. 
When the British government unexpectedly lost a 
rushed vote over their expected involvement in the 
campaign, Obama took the opportunity to deliberate. 
While most of his administration favoured the strikes, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey urged caution as 
did White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough; 
and after an evening walk with the latter on 30 August, 
Obama surprised his staff by announcing that he too 
would seek congressional endorsement. With the 
House of Representatives controlled by an obstructive 
Republican party, approval was not guaranteed, 
and Obama was likely buying time to explore other 
options.21 Almost immediately secretary of state John 
Kerry opened channels to the Russians, and Obama 
met with Putin at the G20 on 6 September. At a press 
conference a few days later, Kerry seemingly stumbled 
over the idea of Assad peacefully turning over his 
chemical weapons to avoid the strike.22 Within days 
19 K. Kanat (2015) A Tale of Four Augusts: Obama’s Syria 
Policy (Washington DC: SETA), p.99.
20 J. Barnes, A. Entous, A., C. Lee, “Obama Proposes $500 
Million to Aid Syrian Rebels”, The Wall Street Journal, 26 June 
2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-proposes-
500-million-to-aid-syrian-rebels-1403813486, accessed 26 
November 2016.
21 A. Entous, and C. Lee, “At the Last Minute, Obama 
Alone Made Call to Seek Congressional Approval”, The Wall 
Street Journal, 1 September 2013, available at http://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424127887324009304579047542466837078, 
accessed 26 November 2016.
22 M. Gordon, and S. Myers, “Obama Calls Russia Offer on 
Syria Possible ‘Breakthrough’”, The New York Times, 10 September 
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/world/
middleeast/kerry-says-syria-should-hand-over-all-chemical-arms.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed 26 November 2016.
Moscow announced a plan to pursue this option and, 
after US-Russian negotiations in Geneva, it was agreed 
that Assad would disarm under the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). A UN 
resolution supporting this was passed unanimously on 
27 September and the US assault was called off.23
The impact on the opposition was clear. The moderate 
forces championing cooperation with the US and 
expecting eventual military intervention lost ground 
to the radicals whose anti-western narrative seemed 
to be vindicated. In September 2013, Islamist groups, 
including some formerly affiliated with the moderate 
Free Syrian Army Supreme Military Command 
(FSA-SMC) joined with Jubhat al-Nusra to denounce 
the Western backed political opposition, the Syrian 
Opposition Coalition. In November, a further group 
of militia disaffiliated from the FSA-SMC to co-
found the Islamic Front.24 This new Salafist military 
force was actively supported by Saudi Arabia, deeply 
frustrated with the US for calling off the strike on 
Assad and willing now to back radical groups opposed 
by Washington.
Saudi Arabia’s frustration with US policy not only 
towards Syria, but also towards the region has been 
expressed in both private and public. The Obama 
administration’s so-called pivot to Asia was a cause for 
concern, as Saudi Arabia questioned US commitment 
to security in the Gulf. Moreover, Obama’s significant 
diplomatic investment in seeking and reaching a 
nuclear deal with Iran – a priority that trumped all other 
regional issues – was seen as move that would neither 
deter Tehran from pursuing its nuclear ambitions nor 
constrain its activities in the Gulf or the Levant. 
Obama’s interview in The Atlantic, where he spelled 
out the tenets of his foreign policy and his successes 
and failures alluded to ‘freeriders’ and in that camp he 
included Saudi Arabia. He had long called upon Saudi 
Arabia and other such freeriders to assume greater 
23 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council 
Requires Scheduled Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons, 
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2118 (2013)”, 27 September 
2013, available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11135.doc.
htm, accessed 26 November 2016.
24 BBC, “Guide to the Syria Rebels”, 13 December 
2013, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-24403003, accessed 26 November 2016.
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responsibility for their own security and the security 
of their neighbourhoods.25 To a large extent, Saudi 
policy towards Syria developed against this backdrop 
and once it had become clear that the US would not 
intervene in the conflict and that Iran – through 
its proxies – was helping the Syrian regime recover 
territory, it opted to intensify efforts to arm and fund 
rebels, irrespective of their ‘extremism’. As mentioned 
above, Bandar was instrumental in mobilising armed 
groups, many of whom were aligned with al-Qaida or 
ISIS to help fight Assad’s regime. 
However, the Russian intervention in September 2015 
constrained Saudi Arabia’s ability to fund and arm rebel 
groups and support their advance in key cities, such as 
Homs, Hamah and Aleppo. The international factor of 
Russian intervention, indeed, was a game-changer that 
affected the course of the Syrian conflict and weakened 
the growing levels of co-operation amongst Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and Turkey in their efforts to oust Assad.
Putin chose to intervene at this particular moment 
of the conflict for four key reasons: Syrian regime 
forces were under increasing pressure and losing 
territory; Saudi Arabia had agreed to host a conference 
for the Syria opposition26 and established the High 
Negotiating Committee27; US policy towards Syria and 
the wider region appeared weak; and to circumvent 
Russia’s growing international isolation following the 
annexation of Crimea and its policy towards Ukraine.
Russia calculated that the Assad regime was under 
severe pressure from opposition forces and required 
direct material support to guarantee its survival. For the 
previous six months, the opposition had been forcing 
the regime back, capturing the major city of Idlib. The 
Syrian regime appeared at its weakest in the summer 
25  J. Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine”, The Atlantic, 
April 2016, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/, accessed 15 
December 2016.
26  “Saudi Arabia Hosts Moderate Syrian Opposition 
Groups”, Al Arabiya News, 8 December 2015, available at https://
english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2015/12/07/Moderate-Syrian-
opposition-groups-arrive-in-Riyadh-.html, accessed 27 November 
2016.
27  Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Final Statement 
of the Conference of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces 
Riyadh”, 14 December 2015, available at http://www.mofa.gov.sa/
sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/ImportantIssues/Pages/
ArticleID20151214143757814.aspx, accessed 27 November 2016.
of 2015, as opposition forces and ISIS made significant 
territorial gains. In June 2015, Assad had given an 
uncharacteristic speech in which he acknowledged 
that manpower shortages had made ceding territory 
necessary. It was the first real indication that the regime 
was under serious strain and could fall.28The Russian 
entry put an end to the rebels’ advances and put paid 
to any potential for an outright military defeat for the 
regime.
Whilst Saudi Arabia hosted a conference for the Syrian 
opposition in December 2015, which brought together 
all groups, except Jabhat al-Nusra in a bid to undermine 
Russia and Syria’s narrative (as well as form the High 
Negotiating Committee), the airstrikes against all 
opposition groups have continued with impunity. 
Moscow has claimed that it is at the forefront of a fight 
against terror, but has overwhelmingly targeted more 
moderate opposition groups.
Russia’s deployment, therefore, was aimed at securing 
the regime and helping it to consolidate and recover 
territory. Without doubt, the intervention has changed 
the balance of power between regime and opposition 
forces; importantly, it has also given Russia an 
indisputable advantage over the US in influencing 
events on the ground.
Russia’s deployment in September 2015 sent a clear 
signal to Syria’s regional neighbours, notably Saudi 
Arabia. It demonstrated a level of commitment that 
other powers, such as the US or EU states, could not 
match. Consequently, this allowed the Syrian regime 
to remain intransigent in international peace talks and 
once again talk about retaking ‘every inch’ of Syria. The 
intervention has clearly shown that Assad’s friends are 
more committed to him than his enemies are to unseat 
him.
28  M. Samaan, and A. Barnard, “Assad, in Rare Admission, 
Says Syria’s Army Lacks Manpower”, The New York Times, 26 July 
2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/
middleeast/assad-in-rare-admission-says-syrias-army-lacks-
manpower.html?_r=0, accessed 27 November 2016.
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Conclusion
Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy has evolved since 2011, 
though its key objectives have remained constant 
– check Iran’s influence in the region and prevent 
contagion from the Arab spring from entering the 
kingdom. It has adopted a series of tactics that at times 
appear inimical to its immediate interests, such as 
funding and arming extremist groups, which arguably 
could lead to blowback at a later stage. 
The kingdom’s Syria policy has been shaped by a 
combination of personal, regional and international 
factors. Late King Abdullah’s approach to Syria was 
highly personal and had been shaped by earlier events. 
He believed that he could re-fashion Assad and pull 
him away from Iran’s influence. In fact, he gave him 
a number of chances to do so, but Assad’s insult to 
Abdulaziz was the final straw. Following that episode, 
Abdullah’s policy was shaped by one objective and that 
was to rid Syria of Assad and ‘flip’ the country towards 
Saudi Arabia. 
Arguably, regional factors were the most influential 
in shaping Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy, namely, its 
competition with Iran, but also its fear of the Muslim 
Brotherhood exploiting the Arab spring to its own 
benefit. Saudi Arabia’s zero-sum game with Iran has 
compelled it to pursue policy options aimed at either 
recovering lost territories and states or at least ‘bogging 
down’ Iran in a long and bloody conflict. Cognisant 
that it had ‘lost’ Iraq to Iran, Saudi leaders, beginning 
with Abdullah remain intent on retaining influence in 
the Syria, even if that means working through proxies 
and spoiling the regime’s chance of re-establishing full 
control of the country.
It is clear that the international environment, which 
has seen Russia play a more active role in the Middle 
East, at a time when the US has shied away from further 
interventions has forced Saudi Arabia to play a more 
assertive role in Syria and other theatres, including 
Yemen. The shift in the international environment 
has also coincided with succession in Saudi Arabia 
and given rise to a leadership that pursues more active 
foreign and defence policies. Therefore, Riyadh will 
continue to back rebel groups, even though Syria 
may have dropped in the priority list and the Russian 
intervention has changed the balance of forces in 
favour of the Assad regime. Saudi Arabia has little 
choice other than to develop a capability to run and 
maintain an insurgency against the Assad regime, 
which will also target Iran-backed militias.
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TURKEY’S FOREIGN 
POLICY TOWARDS 
SYRIA, 2011-2017
Kostas Ifantis and Ioannis Galariotis
Introduction
Turkey is changing and this change is rapidly disrupting 
the Kemalist secular tradition.1 In the foreign policy 
realm, Turkey has been subjected to wide criticism 
since the late 2000s. Its priorities in the Middle East 
and North Africa, at the expense of relations with 
the West, has been described as heavily grounded in 
parochial ideology and dangerous sectarianism.  This 
approach, widely known as ‘Davutoglu doctrine’, has 
resulted in a significant deterioration of relations with 
key regional actors, such as Egypt and Israel, and the 
loss of its potential role as a leader and stabilizer.2
In his 2011 election victory speech, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan expressed confidence that Ankara would 
provide support to newly emerging political actors 
across the Middle East, revealing a clear ambition to 
establish his country as a preeminent power in the 
region.3 However, six years later, Turkey is increasingly 
marginalized; Ankara is criticized for its tolerance of 
1 Many believe that the AKP leadership seeks to reverse 
the secular legacy of Mustafa Kemal by eliminating restrictions 
on Islam and undercutting “the old judicial and military order 
that guarded against the Islamization of Turkey”. See Fradkin, 
Hillel and Libby, Lewis (2013) “Erdogan’s Grand Vision: Rise and 
Decline”, World Affairs Journal, March/April 2013, http://www.
worldaffairsjournal.org/print/63552. Also, Reynolds, Michael 
(2012) “Echoes of Empire: Turkey’s Crisis of Kemalism and the 
Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy”, The Saban Center for 
Middle East Policy at Brookings, Analysis Paper No 26.
2 Aydin-Duzgit, S. (2015) “Turkish Foreign Policy after 
the Elections: Where to from here?”, Global Turkey in Europe, 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_c_25.pdf. 
3 For a theoretical critique of Turkey’s Middle Eastern 
policy see Altunisik, M.B. and L.G. Martin (2011) “Making Sense 
of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP”, Turkish 
Studies, vol.12, no. 4, pp.569-587. Also, see Demirtas-Bagdonas, 
Özlem (2014) “Reading Turkey’s Foreign Policy on Syria: The 
AKP’s Construction of a Great Power Identity and the Politics of 
Grandeur”, Turkish Studies, vol.15, no.1, pp.139-155.
radical Islamic militants in Syria. From a celebrated 
‘zero-problems’ strategy, Turkey now has less than 
functioning relations with almost all of its neighbors.4 
This is partly attributable to the context of its foreign 
policy, which is ideologically driven rather than 
interest based. 
The main argument of this paper is that Turkey’s 
ideologically driven foreign policy and culture-based 
diplomacy has chosen to defy the fast-changing balance 
of power dynamics in the Middle East. Nowhere has 
this been more evident than in the case of the Syrian 
crisis. It is now widely accepted that Turkey’s policy 
in Syria was based on a series of miscalculations. 
Erdogan initially supported Bashar al-Assad, while 
calling for political reforms. When Syria turned to Iran 
for assistance, Ankara did nothing to advance post-
Arab Spring Turkish preferences. Subsequent events, 
such as Russian military engagement, and the rapid 
deterioration of the security landscape only served 
as a reminder of Ankara’s very limited ability to have 
an impact in the Middle East. In the course of events, 
Turkey found itself deeply involved in a sectarian 
conflict that is, by all accounts, bloody, relentless, long-
lasting and multi-faceted. 
What went wrong? How and why has Turkey become 
so deeply entangled with the conflict in Syria? What 
are the implications of lapses in security that have left 
Ankara without friends and allies? This paper aims 
to address these questions. After a brief historical 
account of Turkish-Syrian relations, the discussion 
seeks to shed light on Turkey’s foreign policy aims and 
designs in the Syrian imbroglio. Ankara’s approach and 
actual engagement post-2011 is assessed in the context 
of rapidly deteriorating regional and international 
standing, such that Turkey has accomplished none of 
its original goals.
4 “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World: 
Old Alignments and New Neighbourhoods”, International 
Conference, South East European Studies at Oxford, Oxford 30 
April - 2 May 2010, https://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/
reportfromtfpconf.pdf. 
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From confrontation to 
cooperation and back
Historically, animosity and distrust have plagued 
relations between Turkey and Syria. The trajectory 
of their relationship has been subject to regional 
developments, conflicting alignments and preferences, 
and territorial disputes.5 In the 1930s, the annexation 
by Turkey of the ‘Sanjak’ port in the region of 
Alexandretta resulted in the freezing of relations.6 
The Cold War found Turkey siding with the West and 
NATO, whereas Syria aligned itself with the Soviet 
Union. During the 1960s, Turkey’s7 unilateral intention 
to exploit the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers 
became a major feud. From that time onwards, Turkey 
has used its size and power, and the backing of the US, 
to consolidate its standing in the region. In Damascus, 
Turkey has always been viewed as a western proxy with 
hegemonic designs. In the 1980s, a new element was 
to effect Turkish-Syrian relations, when Syria overtly 
supported the leader of the terrorist organization, the 
PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, and offered shelter to PKK 
fighters. Turkey considered Syria’s continued support 
of the PKK a casus belli. Relations deteriorated again, 
in 1998, when Turkey threatened Syria with war.8 
Ocalan’s expulsion from Syrian territory reduced the 
tension; with the signing of the Adana agreement 
relations were significantly improved.
The victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
and the advent to power of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 
the early 2000s marked a new era in Turkey’s foreign 
policy in the Middle East. The new government, which 
set the re-organization of the Turkish economy as its 
basic goal, followed a foreign policy dogma based on 
the principles of good neighborly relations and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. From his early days in 
office, Erdogan became a strong supporter of Bashar al-
5 Hinnebusch, R. and Ö. Tür (2013) Turkey-Syria 
Relations: Between Enmity and Amity (eds.) (Farnham: Ashgate).
6 Altunisik, M.B. and Ö. Tür (2006) “From Distant 
Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations”, 
Security Dialogue, vol.37, no.2, pp.229-248.
7 Olson, R. (1997) “Turkey-Syria Relations Since the Gulf 
War: Kurds and Water”, Middle East Policy, vol.5, no.2, pp.168-
193.
8 Aras, B. and R.K. Polat (2008) “From Conflict to 
Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria 
and Iran”, Security Dialogue, vol.39, no.5, pp. 495-515.
Assad’s regime in Syria and the two countries quickly 
established good relations.9 In January 2004, Bashar 
Assad became the first Syrian leader to visit Turkey. 
Ankara was instrumental in bringing the Syrian 
regime out of international isolation after the Hariri 
assassination in Lebanon and played a major role in 
2007 and 2008 with its mediation efforts between Syria 
and Israel over the Golan Heights. The negotiations 
collapsed following the Israeli military operation in 
Gaza in December 2008. In April 2009, the two states 
conducted their first joint military exercise to be 
followed in September by the establishment of a Senior 
Strategic Cooperation Council. For the first time, the 
NATO military developed ties with the Syrian Armed 
forces.
Good relations lasted until the outbreak of the Syrian 
civil war. Erdogan, in encouraging Bashar al-Assad to 
follow the route of democratic reform, discovered the 
limits of Turkey’s influence over Damascus. The Syrian 
regime responded with excessive violence, which 
resulted in an all-out civil war. In a dramatic shift, 
Ankara abandoned its support of Bashar al-Assad and 
formed a coalition with opposition groups.10 For the 
first time in its history, Turkey openly strived to end 
a regime in a neighboring country, and treated that 
regime as an enemy. 
Turkey’s engagement in the 
Syrian civil war: An account
Turkey’s engagement in the Syrian civil war can be 
characterized as a volatile policy following the ebb and 
flow of international security dynamics and regional 
developments in the wider Middle East. From the 
outbreak of violence in 2011, Turkey’s approach and 
involvement has changed several times during the 
course of the conflict.
Turkey’s initial response to the Syrian uprising was 
mild, yet vigilant in order to ensure its interests in 
the region and to safeguard the status quo. Erdogan 
attempted to persuade Assad to proceed with major 
political reforms in order to avoid an increase in anti-
9  Taspinar, O. (2012) “Turkey’s Strategic Vision and 
Syria”, The Washington Quarterly, vol.35, no.3: 127-140. 
10  Philips, Christopher (2012) “Into the Quagmire: 
Turkey’s Frustrated Syria Policy”, Briefing Paper, Chatham House.
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regime sentiment and the radicalization of opposition 
groups inside Syria. As Tocci has argued, “Turkey 
exerted significant effort to this end, attempting to 
leverage the political capital built up with the Syrian 
regime, the poster-child of its now beleaguered ‘zero 
problems with neighbors’ policy”.11 However, as the 
crisis unfolded, with conflict and resistance taking 
place in different areas of Syria, Turkey was less willing 
to support the regime. By the time that the uprising had 
escalated and spread to most parts of Syrian territory, 
Ankara had begun to distance itself from the Syrian 
regime, explicitly declaring that it could not remain 
indifferent to the violence.12 
By the summer of 2011, Turkey, in a dramatic policy 
shift, took sides against the regime; it expressed 
unequivocal support for the opposition forces. Under 
Ankara’s tutelage, the Syrian National Council (SNC) 
was formed in Istanbul in August 2011.13 Turkey 
further supported the moves of the opposition by 
opening its borders to armed rebel groups. At the same 
time, it called for the ousting of the Assad regime and 
the formation of a provisional government that could 
pave the way for democratic transition in Syria. At that 
time, the foreign policy preferences of Turkey were 
fully aligned to those of the United States and Europe.
In September 2011, Turkey took the critical decision to 
terminate all contact with the regime in Damascus and 
imposed an arms embargo.14 In addition, Erdogan and 
Davutoglu embarked upon an international campaign, 
calling for Western intervention to topple the regime. 
In November 2011, Erdogan called for Assad to step 
down, he openly supported the Syrian opposition, and 
he did everything he could short of direct military 
intervention. Indeed, the bloodshed in Syria hardened 
the attitude of the international community against the 
Assad regime; the first signs of this position became 
visible when the US and the European Union started 
11  Tocci, Nathalie (2013) “Turkey, Europe and the Syrian 
Crisis: What Went Wrong?”, Commentary 08, Global Turkey in 
Europe, p. 1.
12  Cornell, S. (2012) “Changes in Turkey: What Drives 
Turkish Foreign Policy”, Middle East Quarterly, no 24, pp. 13-24.
13 For a detailed account, see Ilgit, Asli and Rochelle Davis 
(2013) “The Many Roles of Turkey in the Syrian Crisis”, Middle 
East Research and Information Project, http://www.merip.org/
mero/mero012813. 
14 Ibid. 
working towards the imposition of sanctions at the UN 
Security Council. 
The Arab League became more active and proposed 
a peace plan, which failed to produce any meaningful 
breakthrough and finally came to an inglorious end 
in late January 2012.15 Russia and China extended 
vigorous support to the Assad regime by exercising 
their power of veto over a resolution regarding “grave 
and systematic human rights violations in Syria” and 
formally rejected the Arab League’s peace proposals in 
the UN.16 It was patently clear that the Syrian crisis had 
been transformed into something similar to a Cold-
War great power game.17 A second initiative towards 
a cease-fire under the auspices of the then Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, which aimed to establish a UN 
Supervision Mission, although accepted by Damascus 
and most of the international community, including 
Turkey, proved too little and too late. The escalation of 
the violence proved too great a hurdle to overcome.18 
France also undertook an important initiative in parallel 
with Annan’s attempts to end the ceasefire. President 
Sarkozy managed to rally more than 80 countries19 to 
exert pressure on the Assad regime; in April 2012 in 
Istanbul, the so-called “Friends of Syria” signed the 
Istanbul Declaration demanding that the Assad regime: 
(a) put an end to the conflict via the adoption of UN 
and Arab League proposed reforms and (b) recognize 
the SNC as a “legitimate representative of all Syrians”, 
as an umbrella organization leading the opposition 
groups in Syria.20 The fundamental problem with this 
approach was that the Muslim Brotherhood was over-
represented in the leadership of the SNC. Furthermore, 
the Islamic militants were over-represented when the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the SNC combined their 
15 Ibid. 
16  Fifield, Anna “Russia and China veto UN censure on 
Syria”, Financial Times, 5 October 2011. 
17  For a regional assessment, see Satik, Nerouz and Khalid 
Walid Mahmoud (2013) “The Syrian Crisis: An Analysis of 
Neighboring Countries’ Stances”, Policy Analysis, Research Paper, 
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.
18  Doyle, Chris “Kofi Annan’s resignation is no surprise, 
his Syria peace plan undermined”, The Guardian, 2 August 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/02/kofi-
annan-resignation-syria-peace-plan. 
19  China, Russia and Iran were excluded.
20  Ilgit and Davis, 2013, op. cit.
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forces into a new coalition body, the Syrian National 
Coalition, in November 2012, and this too impeded 
any prospect of a peaceful settlement. On 4 October 
2012, the Turkish military pounded targets inside 
Syria in retaliation for a mortar attack a day earlier that 
had killed five civilians in Turkey. Turkey’s parliament 
approved a motion the same day that authorized 
further military action against Syria and permitted 
cross-border raids. Earlier, in June, when Syrian 
forces had shot down a Turkish warplane, Ankara had 
refrained from responding.21 Since then, Turkey has 
been trapped in an ethnic and sectarian imbroglio, 
which became even more complex and violent with the 
ISIS insurgency.
The unwillingness for any large-scale military 
engagement on the ground meant that Turkey found 
itself at odds with the US and Europe. During the 
late spring of 2013, the US and Russia led another 
initiative to bring all sides of the Syrian conflict to the 
negotiating table. Then Ghouta happened. Hundreds 
of people were killed after a chemical bombardment 
in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013.22 The 
Ghouta massacre was another influence on Turkey’s 
approach to the crisis. Ankara intensified its call for 
military intervention, believing that only the large-
scale military involvement of the West, supported 
by Turkey and the Arab Gulf States, could end the 
bloodshed and uproot the Assad regime. 
In the classic fashion of an ultimatum, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 2118 unanimously, 
demanding that Syria destroy or remove its chemical 
stockpile by 2014.23 It also paved the way for the 
beginning of new discussions between the opposing 
parties, to take place in Geneva (Geneva II conference). 
Turkey was afraid that the reluctance of the US and 
others to pursue a military solution “would end up in 
de facto acceptance of the status quo ante, coupled with 
the continuation of low level violence in the months 
21  Arango, T. and Saad, H. “Turkey’s Parliament Approves 
Further Military Action Against Syria”, The New York Times, 4 Oct. 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/middleeast/
syria.html.
22  Gardner F. “Syria conflict: Chemical attacks kill 
hundreds”, http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-
east-23785291/syria-toxic-attacks-kill-hundreds. 
23  Resolution 2118 (2013), S/RES/2118 (2013), United 
Nations Security Council, 27 September 2013, http://www.un.org/
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2118(2013). 
and years ahead”.24 This approach was another grave 
disappointment for Ankara, given its overt support for 
the Syrian Muslim Brothers and tolerance towards the 
more extreme jihadist groups, like Jabhat al-Nusra and 
Ahrar al-Sham. 
Syrian Kurds’ success in Kobane against ISIS and in 
Ras al-Ain against Jabhat al-Nusra created problems 
to Ankara’s policy. Erdogan was betting on the 
failure of the Syrian Kurds in order to minimize any 
Kurdish aspiration for autonomy, backed up by the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD).25 Ankara has denied 
any allegations that Turkey is supporting materially 
diverse groups allied with al-Qaeda, arguing that 
any kind of support from Turkey goes to the FSA.26 
Western diplomats, however, have repeatedly claimed 
that Turkey does not discriminate between groups 
operating under the FSA umbrella, which includes 
those like Jabhat al-Nusra.27 Moreover, the presence of 
such groups in Syria has made any prospect of the West 
supplying the FSA with sophisticated weapons to fight 
Assad’s forces extremely remote.28 Turkey’s reliance on 
these groups to fight against the Assad regime was one 
more grave miscalculation. 
The latest phase of the Syrian tragedy was marked by 
the ISIS presence and insurgency. The rapid advance of 
ISIS changed the strategic imperatives and invited more 
external involvement. On August 8, 2014, Washington 
announced the deployment of air power against ISIS to 
protect the northern region of Iraq, assisting the efforts 
of Iraqi Kurds to face off the threat.29 The US and its 
allies in the Syrian theatre undertook similar military 
action in September 2014.30 
24  Tocci, 2013, op.cit., p. 2.
25  Idiz, Semih, “Tukey’s Syria Policy in Shambles Over 
Support for Jihadists”, 23 July 2013, http://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2013/07/turkey-syria-policy-support-
jihadists.html?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=7839#ixzz2ZzZ7FndH.
26  Solmaz, Mehmet. “Turkey continues to be target 
of blatant ‘aiding ISIS’ allegations”, Daily Sabah, 27 August 
2014, http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/08/27/turkey-
continues-to-be-target-of-blatant-aiding-isis-allegations.
27  Idiz, Semih, 2013.
28  Ibid. 
29  Sedghi, A. and Arnett, G. “US military Isis air strikes 
in Iraq: day-by-day breakdown”, 3 September 2014, https://www.
theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/aug/27/us-military-isis-air-
strikes-in-iraq-day-by-day-breakdown. 
30  Cooper, H. and Schmitt, E. “Airstrikes by US and 
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Although the Obama administration ruled out the 
deployment of ground forces, the decision to aid those 
forces resisting the ISIS onslaught resulted in a major 
dilemma for Ankara. Until then, much of the western 
media and Turkey’s main opposition political parties 
had targeted Ankara for its open-door policy, which 
allowed jihadist militant groups to cross the Turkish-
Syrian borders without restriction.31 Moreover, Ankara 
had been accused of arming and training militants, as 
well as offering shelter to jihadist insurgents, many 
of whom joined ISIS.32 Finally, under international 
pressure and the successful Kurdish resistance to ISIS, 
the Turkish Parliament granted the government the 
authority to send troops into Iraq and Syria in order to 
support the fight against ISIS.33 On July 24, 2015, four 
days after a suicide terrorist attack that killed more 
than 30 Turkish citizens and injured over 100, Turkey 
launched its first ground and air combat operations 
against ISIS in Syria and approved the use of the air 
bases at Incirlik and Diyarbakir for US air strikes.34 
For Washington, the new strategic priority was the 
defeat of ISIS and not the removal of Assad.35 For 
Ankara, if fighting ISIS was the only way to also fight – 
or at least neutralize – PKK-affiliated terrorist groups 
Allies Hit ISIS Targets in Syria”, 22 September 2014, https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/09/23/world/middleeast/us-and-allies-hit-isis-
targets-in-syria.html?_r=0. 
31  Solmaz, M. “Turkey continues to be target of blatant 
‘aiding ISIS’ allegations”, 27 August 2014, https://www.dailysabah.
com/politics/2014/08/27/turkey-continues-to-be-target-of-
blatant-aiding-isis-allegations.  
32  Faiola, A. and Mekhennet, S. “In Turkey, a late 
crackdown on Islamist fighters”, 12 August 2014, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/how-turkey-became-the-shopping-
mall-for-the-islamic-state/2014/08/12/5eff70bf-a38a-4334-9aa9-
ae3fc1714c4b_story.html?utm_term=.6cbdebff51d5.  
33  Letsch, C. and Borger, J. “Islamic State: Turkish MPs 
back Iraq-Syria deployment as ISIS advances”, 2 October 2014,  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/02/turkey-mps-
deployment-iraq-syria-isis.  
34  Sly, L. and DeYoung, K. “Turkey agrees to allow US 
military to use its base to attack Islamic State”, 23 July 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkey-
agrees-to-allow-us-military-to-use-its-base-to-attack-islamic-
state/2015/07/23/317f23aa-3164-11e5-a879-213078d03dd3_story.
html?utm_term=.04f56f97700d. 
35  Kirisci, K. (2014) “Turkey’s ISIL Dilemma: To Fight or 
Not to Fight”, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-
front/posts/2014/10/03-turkey-isil-dilemma-kirisci.
and “other terror elements in Syria”36 then so be it. 
The military operation against ISIS coincided with 
attacks against PKK bases in northern Iraq, breaking 
a fragile cease-fire that had been in force between 
Turkey and the PKK since 2013.37 Even though the US 
also considers the PKK a terrorist organization, they 
have successfully collaborated with PYD armed groups 
against ISIS. Yet, it was still Ankara’s strategic priority 
to thwart gains made by the Kurds in Syria, to prevent 
them from expanding their territory from Tell Abyad 
to Afrin, and to enforce a safe-zone controlled by 
Syrian opposition forces supported by Turkey.38 This 
explains why the Turkish air force did not bomb ISIS 
in Syria’s Euphrates’ valley, where it had been fighting 
PYD militias. Yet, US fighter jets were flying in support 
of PYD units fighting ISIS near Tell Abyad.39 
Enter Russia
The military intervention of Russia further compounded 
Turkey’s frustration with the Syrian crisis. It cancelled 
whatever hopes Ankara had for the establishment of 
a safe-zone along the Syrian-Turkish border. Coupled 
with that, Moscow effectively put an end to Turkey’s 
hope of a Syria without the Assad regime. Both countries 
have sketched different policies for the future of the 
Syrian regime. Behind their Middle Eastern strategies 
there is a logic that could have allowed for convergence. 
However, they have used different tools and means to 
pursue their “penetration” strategies in the Middle 
East: on the one hand, Russia chases penetration over 
material power and relies on fostering mainly state 
level relations; on the other hand, Turkey attempts to 
achieve penetration over religio-cultural affinities and 
values, and, potentially, through clientelistic effects of 
36  Candar, Cengiz: “Turkey’s military actions in Syria will 
be on its own terms”, Al-Monitor, 2 October 2014, http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/originals/2014/10/turkey-syria-united-
states-coalition-vote-military-action.html.
37  Weise, Z. and Stevenson, C. “Turkish airstrikes against 
PKK in Iraq throw two-year ceasefire with Kurds into jeopardy”, 
25 July 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news-19-6/turkish-
airstrikes-against-pkk-in-iraq-throw-two-year-ceasefire-with-
kurds-into-jeopardy-10416213.html. 
38  “Erdogan’s shift on Islamic State linked to Kurdish 
gains in Syria”, 26 July 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2015/07/turkey-attacks-islamic-state-in-syria-pkk-in-
northern-iraq.html. 
39  “Awkward Allies”, The Economist, August 11, 2015.
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its comparative economic advantages.40 
The downing of the Russian jet in November 2015 
served as the highlight to the clash.41 The most 
noteworthy consequence of the episode was the 
opening up to a deepening of Russia’s cooperation 
with the US-led coalition against ISIS and a worsening 
in Turkish-Russian relations, which lasted for most of 
2016.42 Just two days after the downing of the Russian 
jet, President Putin and President Hollande agreed to 
share information about targets in Syria. Moreover, 
Putin declared his readiness to work together with the 
US-led, anti-ISIS coalition.43 
Following Russia’s appearance, Syria became more 
than a “proxy war between Syrian parties backed by 
Iran on the one side, and Qatar, Saudi Arabia  and 
Turkey on the other.  The battlefield now included 
American, Russian  and Iranian forces.”44  The stakes 
have far exceeded Ankara’s agenda and any action it 
took could have resulted in the kind of escalation 
with repercussions far beyond Syria.  In the struggle 
against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra fighters, Russian and 
Assad forces have been much more effective and decisive, 
while Turkish and Arab coalition forces are absent and 
many of the opposition forces have been penetrated by 
Jihadist groups.45 
40  Han, Ahmet “Pride and Pragmatism: Turkish-Russian 
Relations after the Su-24M Incident”, On Turkey, The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, January 2016, P=104, http://
www.gmfus.org/publications/pride-and-pragmatism-turkish-
russian-relations-after-su-24m-incident. 
41  Nissenbaum, D., Peker, E. and Marson, J. “Turkey 
Shoots Down Russian Military Jet”, 24 November 2015, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-shoots-down-jet-near-syria-
border-1448356509. 
42  “Erdogan more isolated than ever on Syria”, 
29 November 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2015/11/syria-turkey-russian-warplane-shot-down-
aftermath-erdogan.html#ixzz3synLoyv1.
43  Roth, A. and Adam, K. “Moscow is ready to 
coordinate with the West over strikes on Syria, Putin says”, 
26 November 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
russia-targets-turkish-economy-in-retaliation-for-downing-of-
warplane/2015/11/26/b0fb7fac-9433-11e5-a2d6-f57908580b1f_
story.html?utm_term=.6e1bbc49e3db. 
44  “Erdogan more isolated than ever on Syria”, http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/syria-turkey-russian-
warplane-shot-down-aftermath-erdogan.html#ixzz3synLoyv1.
45  Ibid.
According to Kadri Gursel,46 Moscow’s ultimate 
objectives in Syria were to save Assad. In order to 
do that, defeating ISIS was essential, and it had the 
additional advantage of bringing Washington closer 
to Russian strategic preferences. Russian thinking had 
it that Turkey’s proxy war against Damascus, backed 
by Riyadh and Doha, was the key factor that could 
lead to the collapse of the Assad regime and had to be 
neutralized. If Turkish territory had not been available 
for  the indiscriminate use of jihadis  since 2011, the 
conditions that gave rise to ISIS would have not taken 
hold in northern Syria, and ISIS would have not grown 
so assertive.47
By the end of 2016, Assad forces had started to control 
Aleppo. The cooperation between US and Russia to 
work on a solution for Aleppo was based on a plan to 
‘wipe out’ all rebel groups from the city.48 Given this 
advancement, Erdogan followed a tactic of ensuring 
that ISIS and the Kurds did not control territories next 
to Turkey’s borders. To do so, Ankara supported the 
Free Syrian Army militia.49 
In summer 2016, the July 15 coup changed substantially 
Turkey’s Syria policy.50 From that moment onwards, 
Erdogan began to distance itself from the US and 
gradually moved closer to Russia. A first implication 
of this policy shift was Turkey’s gradual revision of 
support toward the anti-Assad armed opposition 
forces.51 As Baykent argues, a compromise between 
Turkey and Russia was evident over the Syrian case: 
“As  Russia  tolerated the Turkish military deploying 
in Syria to prevent the Azaz-Jarablus axis from being 
dominated by Kurdish forces, Turkey probably accepted 
not intervening – even on a discursive level – against 
46  Gursel, Kadri, “Ankara falls into Moscow’s trap”, 
9 December 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2015/12/turkey-russia-syria-downing-of-russian-jet-
moscow-lure-trap.html#ixzz3vGdDrchg.
47  Ibid.
48  Yetkin, M. “Trump will find Russia back in the Mideast 
via Syria”, 9 December 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
trump-will-find-russia-back-in-the-mideast-via-syria.aspx?PageI
D=238&NID=107074&NewsCatID=409. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Baykent, Sinan, “Aleppo: Why is the AKP silent?”, 16 
December 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/aleppo-
why-is-the-akp-silent.aspx?pageID=238&nID=107353&NewsCat
ID=396. 
51  Ibid. 
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the joint Syrian-Russian operations in Aleppo.”52 
Turkish foreign policy makers hope that Putin will 
aid Turkey to counterbalance the PYD in northern 
Syria. However, this does not seem a realistic goal for 
the time being. The signs by early 2017 were not very 
encouraging for Ankara. For instance, “Turkey failed 
to convince the United States and Russia to allow it to 
assume active participation in retaking the Syrian town 
of Raqqa from ISIS”, on the condition collaboration 
ended with the PYD53. By March 2017, scenarios 
to liberate Raqqa gave no active role to Turkey.54 
Washington deployed US forces between PYD and 
Turkish lines near Manbij and thus efficiently blocked 
a planned offensive by Turkey and its Syrian allies.55 In 
addition, the US airlifted the PYD and its allied Arab 
fighters across the Euphrates, to  the strategic Tabqa 
Dam near Raqqa.56 Marginalized, Turkey announced 
on March 29, 2017 that it ends military operations in 
Syria.57
Turkey has expected a policy shift with the election of 
Donald Trump. However, “it increasingly looks like 
Ankara and Washington are heading for a squabble, 
if not a divorce.”58 American support for the PYD 
remains unquestionable. Erdogan has turned to Russia 
for alliance: the two sides announced an agreement, 
in principle, on the delivery to Turkey of the Russian 
made S-400 air and missile defense system.59 
On 25 April 2017, Turkish air forces attacked American-
52  Ibid. 
53  Yetkin, Murat, “Antalya meet fails to convince US, 
Russia on Turkish role in Raqqa”, 18 March 2017, http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/antalya-meet-fails-to-convince-us-russia-
on-turkish-role-in-raqqa.aspx?PageID=238&NID=110960&News
CatID=409.
54  Ibid. 
55  Trofimov, Y. “Three-Way Contest for Raqqa to Shape 
Mideast”, 9 March 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/three-way-
contest-for-raqqa-to-shape-mideast-1489055407. 
56  Abi-Habib, M. and Abdulrahim, R. “In Raqqa, Signs 
of Faltering Islamic State Rule”, 28 March 2017, https://www.
wsj.com/articles/in-raqqa-signs-of-faltering-islamic-state-
rule-1490726293. 
57  Srivastava, M. and Pitel, L. “Tillerson fails to ease 
tensions with Turkey”, Financial Times, Friday 31 March 2017.
58  Trofimov, Y. “US, Turkey are set on a collision Course”, 
The Wall Street Journal, Friday-Sunday, March 31 – April 2, 2017.
59  “Turkey, Russia clinch agreement on S-400 air defense 
system deliveries”, 28 April, 2017, http://tass.com/defense/943772. 
allied Kurdish militias in Iraq and Syria.60 Those 
airstrikes further worsened US-Turkey relations. A 
crisis over the US partnership with the PYD militias is 
brewing.61 Through this way, Ankara wants to give the 
message of “not without me” to the US in the strongest 
way possible.62 It seems, however, that the US has made 
its plans based on the PYD presence on the ground. 
The Kurdish ‘repercussions’ 
The Syria crisis has brought to the fore the ‘Kurdish 
issue’.63 The civil war seemed to be a good opportunity 
for most of Syria’s Kurds to carve out an autonomous 
or even sovereign Kurdish region in Syria. This is not 
acceptable to Ankara; it could provoke other Kurdish 
separatists to fight for independence.64 In 2012, the 
PKK set up its most powerful operation against 
Turkish armed forces. Turkey’s foreign policy makers 
have always believed that Syria’s Kurds supported the 
PKK, backed-up by the Assad regime 65. Under the 
leadership of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), 
Syrian Kurds reinforced their military positions across 
the 911 kilometers of the Turkish-Syrian border. In 
this context, Iran, Baath, Baghdad and the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq came into 
Turkey’s Kurdish equation. 
During the first Gulf War, the perspective of a 
divided Iraq became one of Turkey’s nightmares in 
the foreign policy security context. Its main fear was 
that the division of Iraq would maximize the chances 
60  Gordon, M. and Kakol, K. “Turkish Strikes Target 
Kurdish Allies of US in Iraq and Syria”, 25 April 2017, https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/world/middleeast/turkey-kurds-
airstrikes-iraq-syria.html. 
61  Malsin, J. “Turkey on a ‘Collision Course’ With the 
US After Striking Kurdish Militias”, 27 April 2017, http://time.
com/4757298/turkey-united-states-militias-kurdish-ypg/. 
62  Yetkin, M. “US-Turkey collision course”, 30 April 2017, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/us-turkey-collision-course.asp
x?pageID=449&nID=112594&NewsCatID=409. 
63  Pergolizzi, Emanuela (2013) “An Uncertain Road to 
Peace: Domestic and Regional Challenges in the Turkish-Kurdish 
Process”, IAI Working Papers 13, Istituto Affari Internazionali. 
Also, Pusane, O.K. (2014) “Turkey’s Kurdish Opening: Long 
Awaited Achievements and Failed Expectations”, Turkish Studies, 
vol.15, no.1, pp. 81-99. 
64  “Ankara warns Barzani over autonomy in Syria”, 
Hurriyet Daily News, November 3-4, 2012.
65  Paul, Amanda, “Turkey gets tough on Syria”, Sunday’s 
Zaman, 7 October 2012.
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for the genesis of an independent Kurdistan. Such 
a development could bolster Kurdish separatism 
elsewhere, especially within Turkish territory. 
However, that fear was substantially reduced by the 
political-economic relations that the KRG and Turkey 
had developed over the previous decade.  
The positive prospect for intense cooperation with the 
KRG in the fields of the economy and energy forced 
President Erdogan to start direct talks with Ocalan 
and PKK European representatives. That choice was 
not easy, but it was probably the best option given the 
regional context that was being formed in the wider 
Middle East area. The new reality was that Turkey’s 
official opposition to the Assad regime had as an 
outcome the conjunction of the PKK’s military wing, 
based in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Kandil Mountains, and the 
Tehran-Damascus axis. The PKK found itself to be a 
valuable actor in the Syrian crisis, coming closer to the 
Iran-Syria axis with the support of Russia following in 
2011. Hence, the PKK was striving to support its own 
regional interests while becoming a major player for 
the main actors of the Syrian conflict, i.e. Syria and 
Iran. 
The reinforcement of the PKK created an enigma for 
Turkish foreign policy: how was it to be dealt with? 
This new development had left Ankara with one 
viable option: to work with the PKK by disengaging 
it from the Tehran-Damascus alliance. While that was 
enough to say, it was difficult in practice. Turkey had 
no real influence over the PKK leaders at their Kandil 
Mountains headquarters adjacent to Iran; only Ocalan 
had the power to exercise real influence66. On 21 March 
2013, a cease-fire came into effect. Prospects looked 
optimistic for a brave breakthrough.67 
However, these optimistic scenarios for the future 
of the Turkish Kurdish problem have been further 
complicated by Turkey’s ambiguous policy towards 
the Syrian crisis and Iraq. On the one hand, Turkey 
had been supporting the Iraqi Kurds against ISIS in 
northern Iraq, while on the other, it gave no help to 
Syrian Kurds against the bloody operations of ISIS 
66  Candar, Cengiz, “Turkey’s Kurdish Initiative in 
Regional Context”, Al-Monitor, 7 April 2013, www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2013/04/syria-iraq-aspects-turkey.  
67  Gunter, M.N. (2014) “The Turkish-Kurdish Peace 
Process Stalled in Neutral”, Turkish Inside, vol.16, no.1, pp.19-26.
in Syria.68 This policy had a straightforward effect on 
Turkey’s attitude towards Turkish Kurds, promising 
them a viable future through the peace made with 
the PKK, while thwarting their ambitions for the 
emergence of an independent Kurdish state.69 
The Kobane battle in the fall of 2014 marked the 
end of Turkey’s regional desires. The ISIS siege of 
this predominantly Kurdish town in Syria, and the 
resistance of its defenders, brought about “the coup de 
grace against Ankara’s Middle Eastern policy”.70 The 
takeover of Mosul in Iraq in June 2014 had already 
altered the strategic situation in Syria and Iraq.71 On 
the one hand, the cruelty of ISIS maximized Western 
support for the survival of the Assad regime. On the 
other hand, the reluctance of the West to use the 
military power required to end the conflict was a 
defining feature for the promotion of the Kurdish 
fighters against ISIS in the security equation.72 
Conclusions 
Plagued by serious miscalculations and ideological 
blindness, Ankara missed the opportunity to become a 
leader in the Syrian crisis. Six years after the outburst of 
the conflict, none of its expectations has come to pass 
while its list of friends has grown very thin. Turkey 
failed to grasp the regional demographic, religious and 
political interrelations, with deep sectarian fault-lines, 
while overestimating its capacity to influence unfolding 
developments. It also clearly underestimated the 
resilience of the pro-Assad forces and overestimated 
68  Zaman, Amberin: “Syrian Kurds continue to blame 
Turkey for backing ISIS militants”, Al-Monitor, 10 June 2014, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/zaman-syria-
kurds-rojava-ypg-muslim-pyd-pkk-turkey-isis.html. 
69  Cagaptay, Soner, “Turkey’s Kurdish Buffer”, 
Foreign Affairs, 1 July 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/141612/soner-cagaptay/turkeys-kurdish-buffer.
70  Ozel, Soli and Behlul Ozkan, “Illusions versus reality”, 
FRIDE Policy Brief no 200, April 2015, p. 6. 
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid. Also, Cooper, Helene and Schmitt, Eric “Airstrikes 
by US and Allies Hit ISIS Targets in Syria”, The New York Times, 
22 September 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/world/
middleeast/us-and-allies-hit-isis-targets-in-syria.html?_r=1. 
Also, Civiroglu, Mutlu, “Turkey’s passive-aggressive inaction 
in Kobani is anti-Kurd, anti-peace politics. And it’s dangerous”, 
The Guardian, 14 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/oct/14/turkey-inaction-kobani-kurdish-
peace-politics.
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the willingness of the US and Europe to take the risk of 
forcing the Assad regime from power.73
The three main reasons why Turkey adopted an 
attitude that was far removed from reality were first, a 
gross underestimation of the institutional and military 
resistance of the Assad regime; second, a false reading 
of the willingness of the West to militarily engage 
Assad;74 and third, the “Sunnification” of Turkish 
foreign policy.75 Ankara also underestimated Moscow’s 
political support to Assad and the importance it 
attached to the survival of the regime. Coupled with 
that, Turkey overestimated the power of the Syrian 
National Council, Free Syrian Army and other armed 
groups to fight the Assad regime effectively. Finally, 
Ankara supported Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS against the 
criticisms and warnings of the West.76 
These faulty expectations about the dynamics of the 
conflict and its future pace trapped Turkish diplomacy 
into a serious sectarian conflict with its neighbors.77 
“The ‘zero problems’ policy was always predicated on 
the flawed assumption that none of the other regional 
actors had any interests and preference that ran counter 
to those of Ankara”.78 This profound deterioration in 
the security context in which Turkey has been aspiring 
to play a major role will, to a significant extent, affect 
the nature of Turkey’s relations with the US and the 
West in general.79 
73  Stephens, Philip, “Turkey has stumbled on the road to 
Damascus”, Financial Times, Friday, 26 October 2012.
74  Ibid.
75  Idiz, Semih, “The ‘Sunnification’ of Turkish Foreign 
Policy”, 1 March 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2013/03/akp-sunni-foreign-policy-turkey-sectarianism.
html. 
76  Zeyrek, Deniz, “Turkey’s Syria Policy: Success or 
Bankruptcy?”, Radikal, 26 May 2013.
77  Robins, P. (2013) “Turkey’s “double gravity” 
predicament: The foreign policy of a newly activist power”, 
International Affairs, vol.89, no.2, pp. 381-397 and Cockburn, 
Patrick “How Turkey blew its chance to lead this troubled region”, 
The Independent, 29 September 2013.
78  Cornell 2012, op. cit., p. 22.
79  Lesser, Ian (2012) “Turkey, Syria and the Western 
Strategic Imperative”, Commentary 02, Global Turkey in Europe.
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HEZBOLLAH’S 
LEBANESE STRATEGY 
IN THE SYRIAN 
CONFLICT
Marina Calculli
Introduction
Why did Hezbollah intervene in the Syrian war? 
Not only is this intervention harmful for its political 
base in Lebanon, but also the likelihood of success 
in a protracted violent conflict is highly uncertain. 
Hezbollah officially entered the Syrian war in May 
2013, when the Syrian army was losing ground, whilst 
fighting with rebel forces in al-Qusayr, near the Syrian-
Lebanese border. The ‘Party of God’ has arguably 
changed the course of that battle in favour of the Syrian 
Arab Army (SAA) and enhanced its presence in Syria 
ever since, deploying up to 8,000 fighters (perhaps 
more).1 This poses a major dilemma for an armed 
group with limited capabilities that has never engaged 
in a sustained conflict. Furthermore, the party has been 
facing a substantial decline in credibility: by engaging 
in a competition with Sunni armed groups, labelled 
as ‘terrorists’ and takfiriyyn,2 Hezbollah drastically 
recalibrated its doctrine of resistance (muqawama), 
formerly applied to its exclusive archenemy, Israel, and 
abandoned its previous claim to Muslim unity (wahda 
islamiyya). All this compromised the image of the 
‘hero’ that the party had built up in the wake of the 2006 
July war (harb tammuz) against Israel. Therefore, the 
benefits of Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria are not at all 
obvious, while the costs are clear and immediate. What 
is also puzzling is that Hezbollah officially announced 
1  Navad Pollak, ‘The transformation of Hezbollah by 
its involvement in Syria, The Washington Institute of Near East 
Policy’, n.35, August 2016, p.4. http://www.washingtoninstitute.
org/policy-analysis/view/the-transformation-of-hezbollah-by-its-
involvement-in-syria. 
2  Muslims who claim to be the right interpreters of Islam 
and accuse others of apostasy – generally referred to Sunni jihadi 
groups currently fighting in Syria.
its engagement in Syria in 2013, whereas hundreds of 
Hezbollah fighters had already joined the Syrian war 
since late 2011, although in a scattered and informal 
manner. However, the Party, had systematically denied 
its military engagement in support of the regime of 
Bashar al-Assad. It was only with the al-Qusayr battle 
that it flamboyantly announced its participation to the 
conflict, shifting from secrecy to publicity.
This paper aims at explaining the logic of Hezbollah’s 
official engagement in the Syrian conflict and to shed 
light on the domestic strategy that the Party has pursued 
through its intervention in Syria. Existing explanations 
do not seem to offer clear answers. On the one hand, 
there are those who consider Hezbollah’s intervention 
in Syria as part and parcel of Iran’s sectarian (Shi’a) 
strategy in the Levant.3 On the other hand, there are 
those who see Hezbollah’s engagement as a necessity, 
that is an obligation towards its strategic patron-allies, 
Iran and Syria4.
Yet, Hezbollah has resorted to a wide and original 
range of instruments to justify its intervention in 
Syria. It would be then reductive to see the Party’s 
role as essentially sectarian. Moreover, although the 
Iran-Syria-Hezbollah alliance is undeniably key to 
understanding the Party’s strategic involvement in the 
conflict, this explanation falls short of appreciating 
Hezbollah’s autonomous choices and modalities of 
engagement in the battleground. In fact, those who 
give primacy to external actors tend to exaggerate their 
influence and underestimate local agency,5 especially 
how local players may enable and manipulate external 
sponsors to pursue their own autonomous agenda.
I content that the style of Hezbollah’s intervention in 
3  Philip Smith, ‘How Iran is building its Syrian 
Hezbollah’, The Washington Institute, 8 March 2016. http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-iran-is-
building-its-syrian-hezbollah.
4  See for instance: Aram Nerguizian, “Assessing the 
consequences of Hezbollah’s Necessary War of Choice in Syria”, 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, June 17, 2013, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-consequences-hezbollah’s-
necessary-war-choice-syria.
5  See among others: Ariel I. Ahram (2011) Proxy 
Warriors : The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press); Henning Tamm (2016) 
“The Origins of Transnational Alliances: Rulers, Rebels, and 
Political Survival in the Congo Wars,” International Security, 
vol.41, no.1, pp:147–181. 
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Syria rather points to the Party’s domestic strategy 
of survival within the Lebanese power-sharing 
system. More specifically, the publicity of Hezbollah’s 
engagement has been meant to deter its rivals from 
escalating the domestic conflict and force them to 
negotiate a new political status quo. I explain this 
by placing Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria into the 
context of the Party’s public displays of violence. I 
content that Hezbollah’s demonstrations of force have 
been primarily geared towards instantiating the Party’s 
claim to an active political role in Lebanon and resist 
rival attempts to weaken and disband it. Hezbollah’s 
violent engagement in Syria – this paper shows – is no 
exception. 
To make my argument, I first locate Hezbollah within 
the “axis of refusal” to shed light on the strategic value 
as well as on the contradictions of the Iran-Syria-
Hezbollah’s alliance. I then analyse the actual gains 
of Hezbollah in both Syria and Lebanon since 2013. 
Here I show that Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria has 
served primarily to expand its political role in Lebanon. 
Finally, I discuss more broadly the Party’s strategy 
of legitimizing its military engagement in Syria. By 
recalibrating the notion and doctrine of muqawama 
to the fight against Sunni jihadi groups in Syria and 
the Middle East, Hezbollah has emerged as a major 
‘status quo’ defender. By so doing, it has strengthened 
the alliance with conservative forces against newfound 
attempts to neutralize it.
Hezbollah’s place within the 
“axis of refusal”
There is a general tendency in the literature to treat 
Hezbollah as a non-state actor, with a Lebanese grip and 
a regional standing. By emphasizing the importance 
of its ideological commitment to the Iranian Islamic 
revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini’s wilayat al-faqih 
(the “doctrine of the legislator”), some analysts and 
scholars essentially portray Hezbollah as a proxy 
of Iran.6 Others shed light on transnational Shi’ite 
6  See, for instance: Matthew Levitt, A Proxy for 
Iran, The Washington Institute, July 14, 2016, http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/a-proxy-for-iran.  
(accessed August 20, 2016); see also: Matthew Levitt (2013) 
Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God 
(London: CHurst & CoPublishers Ltd).
identity in the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah “axis of refusal” 
(mahwar al-mumana’a) [or “resistance movement” 
(harakat al-muqawama)].7 Seen from this angle, 
Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian conflict would 
be a combination of duty towards regional patrons and 
sectarianism. There is a palpable element of interaction 
between structure and agency in this position, as 
Hezbollah’s agency is analysed in relation to structural 
constraints.8 But whilst we know that the party is vitally 
dependent on Iranian supply of weapons and funding, 
it also shows autonomy in providing social services,9 
construction of a religious sphere,10 and partaking in 
Lebanese politics since 1992.11 As Hokayem put it, 
“the idea of Hezbollah as a client of Iran and Syria has 
become obsolete due to the power base the Shi’te group 
has nurtured and expanded in Lebanon”.12 
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 conflict 
in Syria, sectarian self-victimization, often propagated 
by opportunistic political elites, has been a trigger 
of conflict and transnational feelings of belonging 
to a community under existential threat.13 Yet, it is 
7  Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts 
within Islam Will Shape the Future, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 
2006).
8  Karim Knio (2013) “Structure, Agency And Hezbollah: 
A Morphogenetic View,” Third World Quarterly vol.34, no.5, 
pp.856–872; Lina Khatib, Dina Matar, and Atef Alshaer (2014) 
The Hizbullah Phenomenon: Politics and Communication (London: 
Hurst & Company), pp.17–24.
9  Rola El Husseini (2010) “Hezbollah and the Axis of 
Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria,” Third World Quarterly, vol.31, 
no.5, pp.803–815; Mona Harb (2010) Le Hezbollah À Beyrouth 
(1985-2005). De La Banlieue À La Ville (Harmattan); Mona Harb 
and Reinoud Leenders (2005) “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 
‘terrorism’ and the Politics of Perception,” Third World Quarterly, 
vol.26, no.1, pp.173–197; Augustus R. Norton (2009) Hezbollah: 
A Short History; with a New Afterword by the Author, Princeton 
Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Oxford: Princeton 
University Press).
10  Lara Deeb (2013) Leisurely Islam: Negotiating 
Geography and Morality in Shi’ite South Beirut, Princeton Studies 
in Muslim Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press).
11  Magnus Ranstorp (1998) “The Strategy and Tactics 
of Hizballah’s Current ‘Lebanonization Process,’” Mediterranean 
Politics, vol.3, no.1, pp.103–134; Norton, Hezbollah.
12  Emile El-Hokayem (2007) “Hizballah and Syria: 
Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship,” The Washington Quarterly, 
vol.30, no.2, pp.35.
13  Marina Calculli (2016) ‘Middle East Security: 
Conflict and Securitization of Identities’, in Louise Fawcett 
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questionable whether these transnational bonds are 
breaking state borders. They rather seem to coexist 
and compete with national ties. Historically, political 
Shi’ism has been adapted in each country to the 
peculiar domestic political context. The perception 
of an existential threat stemming from Sunni jihadi 
groups, such as the Islamic State, may have fostered 
a pan-Shi’ite feeling of victimhood (parallel to a 
pan-Sunni sentiment of oppression by the Shi’ites). 
However, national identities show surprising resilience, 
amidst conflict and fragmentation.14 In addition to this, 
Twelver Shi’ites of Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan 
do not necessarily believe that the Alawites (to whom 
Bashar al-Asad belongs) can be considered as part of 
the Shi’ite faith community. Contestation of the Shi’ite 
identity of the Alawites was curbed in the 1980s as a 
result of Syria’s strategic alignment with Iran. 
It is also noteworthy that the relationship between 
Hezbollah and Syria sharply differs from the one 
between Hezbollah and Iran, and the Party itself has 
tried to avoid sectarian characterizations with regard 
to its engagement in Syria. For instance, the member 
of Parliament (MP) and intellectual Hassan Fadlallah 
recalled in his writings the fierce rivalry between Syria 
and the Party during the civil war, and the repression 
of Hezbollah’s activists by Syria in 1993.15 Fadlallah also 
attributes the opening of a new era of collaboration 
with Damascus to the shift of Hezbollah’s dossier from 
the supervision of former Syrian Foreign Minister 
Abdul Halim Khaddam to that of Farouq al-Shara.16 
Pragmatism, therefore, seems to be more relevant than 
actual religious bounds. Incidentally, these bonds have 
anyway not prevented rifts and rivalries at different 
points in time. 
(ed.), International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), pp.219-235.
14 Roschanack Shaery-eisenlohr (2007) “Postrevolutionary 
Iran And Shi’i Lebanon: Contested Histories Of Shi’i 
Transnationalism,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
vol.39, no.2, pp.271–289; Laurence Louër (2008) Transnational 
Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, CERI 
Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies (London: 
Hurst in association with the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches 
Internationales, Paris), pp.225–63.
15 For instance, in 1993, Syria repressed and killed 
Hezbollah activists protesting against the Oslo accords, of which 
Syria was part of. 
16 Hassan Fadlallah (2014) Hezbollah w dawla fi Lubnan 
[Hezbollah and the State in Lebanon] (Sharka al-matbu’at liltuzy’ 
w al-nashar, Beirut), pp.118-123.
Yet, although corroborated by the production of Shi’a 
transnational symbolism – such as the transformation of 
the Sayyida Zaynab mosque in Damascus into a shrine 
for Shi’ite pilgrims – Shi’ites from all over the Middle 
East, including the Lebanese, fall short of recognizing a 
transnational identification as superior to the national/
local one. In Lebanon, for instance, whereas the Shi’ite 
community has overall supported the 2013 Hezbollah’s 
intervention in Syria, civilians belonging to the so-
called ‘society of resistance’ (mujtama al-muqawama) 
– Hezbollah’s base – have recurrently questioned the 
“military adventure” (mughamara askariyya) in a 
“foreign country” (balad ajnaby) and even organized 
closed-door workshops to discuss the appropriateness 
of the Party’s intervention in Syria17.
Moreover, although many Hezbollah supporters justify 
the Party’s engagement in Syria as a “sacred defense” 
(al-difa’ al-muqaddas) of the Shi’a community, they do 
not feel ideologically affiliated with Syrian president 
Bashar al-Assad, who is largely seen as a secularist and 
corrupted ruler – far from the ethics of Hezbollah, 
which is in their view a Party with “clean hands” 
(ayad nadifa)18. In this regard, they do not consider 
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria as a defense of Assad, 
but rather as a strategic necessity aimed at countering 
the influence of Gulf powers, especially Saudi Arabia, 
and Gulf-sponsored Sunni armed groups in the Levant. 
They perceive the Gulf states as obsessed with the 
Shi’ites, and they believe that the Gulf states’ regional 
policy seeks to marginalize the Shi’ites, if not erase 
them from earth. Episodes, such as the execution of 
the prominent Shi’ite cleric Nimr al-Nimr in January 
2016, are echoed by mass protests in the whole Middle 
East.19 In a similar vein, Saudi war on the Houthis in 
Yemen, started in 2015, is seen as merely driven by 
anti-Shi’te sentiments. In an unprecedented move, 
during the 2015 celebration of the ‘Ashura,20 in Dahiye 
(Beirut), the crowd gathered around Hassan Nasrallah 
17 Author’s conversations with Hezbollah’s electoral 
supporters in Beirut, Bint Jbeil, Hermel, Srifa, Tyr (15-26 August 
2015). 18 out of 20 people explicitly pointed to the Syrian conflict 
as “foreign”.
18 Author’s conversations with Hezbollah’s electoral 
supporters in Beirut (September 14, 2016).
19 cleric http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-35213244.
20  When the Shi’ites remember the martyr of Husseyn.
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started chanting “death to al-Saud” (al-mut lil-Sa’ud).21 
Whereas all this may point to sectarianism, these facts 
neither foster inter-Shi’te solidarity, nor they smooth 
intra-Shi’te rivalries and competition. For instance, 
the other Lebanese Shi’a party AMAL has not actively 
supported Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian war 
in 2011, and the competition between AMAL and 
Hezbollah has grown ever since.22 
Finally, it is noteworthy that Hezbollah’s intervention 
in the conflict sparked controversy amongst the Syrian 
army and intelligence. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that Syrian generals have hardly accepted Hezbollah 
taking the command in security operations and 
training SAA officers and Special Forces in guerrilla 
warfare. Not surprisingly, there has been evidence of 
clashes between Syrian officers and Hezbollah fighters 
along the battle of Aleppo.23 In 2015, a strong debate 
within the Syrian establishment on the expanding 
role of Hezbollah and Iran in Syria even led to the 
killing of Rustom Ghazali, a Syrian top intelligence 
figure.24 Put differently, Hezbollah’s presence on the 
Syrian battleground has been and remains highly 
controversial and contested from both a Lebanese and 
a Syrian standpoint. The fact that foreign state and non-
state military forces most probably outnumbered SAA 
officers on active duty in 201625 only testifies to the 
weakness of the Assad regime, and the indispensability 
of external military support. 
Yet, the evidence provided in this section suggests that 
Damascus did not dictate the terms and the limits 
of the Party’s intervention. Most crucially, whereas 
Hezbollah’s intervention was negotiated with Iran and 
Syria, external sponsoring and the idea of Hezbollah as 
a “proxy” does not explain why in May 2013 the ‘Party 
of God’ announced its participation in the Syrian war; 
21  http://janoubia.com/2015/10/24/هتاف-الموت-لآل-سعود-
بدل-اموت-لأمريك/.
22 https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/566733-
the-not-so-cold-war-between-amal-movement-and-hezbollah.
23 https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/567106-
hezbollah-clashes-with-syria-regime-troops-activists.
24  Marina Calculli, ‘The Iran-Russia alignment in Syria’, 
Aspenia online (October 26, 2015), https://www.aspeninstitute.it/
aspenia-online/article/iran-russia-alignment-syria.
25 https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/11/26/
hizballahs-nasrallah-holds-meeting-with-assad-on-syria-lebanon-
border.
hence, breaking with the past two years (2011-2013) 
in which its belligerent engagement in Syria had been 
informal and publicly denied. Is this a sign of a major 
transformation of Hezbollah from a domestic into a 
regional force?
Is Hezbollah going regional?
Hezbollah has led prominent military operations in 
al-Quseyr, Aleppo, Zabadani, Homs, Qalamun and 
Quneitra.26 In addition, the Party has rapidly adapted 
to new types of warfare, especially long-distance 
fighting, driving tanks and coordinating with (Russian) 
airpower27 – something unprecedented for an armed 
group exclusively used to guerrilla warfare in Southern 
Lebanon against Israel. Also, the Party has trained and 
coordinated with Syrian militias, that increasingly 
imitate Hezbollah’s ideological and structural frame. 
These militias mainly recruit in the villages of Nubl 
and Zahara, where the majority of the population 
is Twelver Shi’a.28 Moreover, new reserve battalions 
in both Syrian and Lebanon have been created, also 
recruiting Sunnis and Christians.29 Whereas all this 
testifies to an extension of Hezbollah’s grip, possibly 
indicating that the Party has been transformed into 
a de facto “conventional force” increasingly active in 
multiple battlefields,30 there is no clear evidence of a 
permanent regionalization of Hezbollah, nor of its 
detachment from the political and social Lebanese 
dimension. 
Quite on the contrary, from 2011 to 2016, the Party 
has unprecedentedly expanded its political hold on 
Lebanese institutions. Incidentally, Hezbollah has 
calibrated its presence in Syria to the strategic needs 
hitherto, withdrawing its fighters during calm periods.31 
26 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3075681/
Hezbollah-leads-fight-strategic-Syrian-mountain-range.html.
27 http://www.timesofisrael.com/thanks-in-no-small-part-
to-russia-hezbollah-is-now-a-full-fledged-army/.
28 http://www.joshualandis.comblogsyrianhezbollah-
militias-nubl-zahara/.
29 https://now.mmediamelbenreportsfeatures/565936-
hezbollahs-recruiting-of-sunnis-in-the-bekaa.
30 https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/
commentaryanalysis/567516-hezbollahs-army-in-syria-is-good-
news.
31 https://now.mmedia.melbenNewsReports/566739-
hezbollah-withdrawing-fighters-from-syria-report.
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More saliently, the Party seems aware of the fact that “the 
burdens of the war are sustainable in the short run, but 
Hezbollah has not unlimited resources”.32 The Party’s 
social base is also very sensitive to the sustainability 
of Hezbollah’s welfare, which has proven to affect 
popular support for military operations. Anecdotal 
accounts suggest that Hezbollah’s electoral base is 
increasingly worried that the military engagement in 
Syria will affect their economic stability, and is waiting 
for a full withdrawal from Syria.33 After December 
2015, Hezbollah was hit by the US ‘International 
Financing Prevention Act of 2015’, which froze bank 
accounts and assets likely to be destined to the Party. 
All his piled up with the already planned cancelation 
or postponement of different infrastructural projects 
in Dahiye and South Lebanon by the construction 
company Jihad al-Bina’.34 As a result, during summer 
2016, amidst a massive and costly military campaign 
on Aleppo, Hezbollah disposed of an increase in 
pensions and salaries, following widespread social 
disappointment with previous cuts.35 Otherwise, 
the culture of martyrdom cannot suffice as a viable 
symbolic glue for the rather narrow Shi’a Lebanese 
community. Finally, if the Syrian regime wins the war 
– what Hezbollah is fighting for – it is unlikely that it 
will foresee a newfound “Syrian role” for the party, so 
far considered no more than an “allied force” (al-quwat 
al-halifat – pl.). 
On the one hand, Hezbollah decided to join the Syrian 
conflict for a clear strategic reason: a fall of the Syrian 
regime, which seemed incumbent in May 2013, would 
have hindered the feasibility of Hezbollah’s weapons 
procurement. By intervening in Syria, Hezbollah 
managed to alter the power distribution within the 
“axis”, improving the position of the ‘resistance’, and 
32  Author’s interview with Hezbollah’s MP, Ali Fayad 
(Beirut, 3 May 2015).
33  Author’s conversations with Hezbollah’s supporters 
(Srifa and Tyr, 8-9 September 2016).
34  In my conversations with supporters of Hezbollah 
(Beirut, 5-6 September 2016), six people reported to me that they 
were aware of infrastructural projects that had been budgeted by 
Hezbollah and then canceled. 
35  In conversation I had with four people, they declared 
their salary depends on Hezbollah; all declared they had received 
more money, and this was not only a random, but a structural 
measure taken by the party in June-July 2016 (Beirut, 6 September 
2016).
finally renegotiating the terms of Syrian presence 
and manoeuvring in Lebanon. However, Hezbollah’s 
military gains have not produced enduring advantages 
in Syria and the Middle East. Yet, the strategic publicity 
of its intervention in 2013 – the visible display of force, 
coordination and adaptation to the new warfare – can 
be better explained as part of a domestic calculation, 
meant to deter rivals from engaging in formal and 
informal actions to harm the muqawama, secure and 
enhance Hezbollah’s positioning within Lebanese State 
institutions. To understand this move, we need to place 
the 2013 intervention in Syria within the wider context 
of Hezbollah’s material and symbolic historical displays 
of force since 2000, and the political meaning of these 
manifestations of force within the Lebanese corporate 
power-sharing system.
Hezbollah’s Lebanese 
strategy in Syria
In a speech announcing that Hezbollah was ready 
to join the fighting in Syria, in April 2013, Hassan 
Nasrallah argued that 30,000 Lebanese Christians and 
Muslims living on the Syrian-Lebanese borderland 
were being threatened by Islamist groups who were 
fighting in al-Qusayr against the Syrian Army.36 In 
another speech,37 on May 25, Nasrallah referred to 
the insufficiency of State defence facing the Israeli and 
other regional threats to their borders. The lack of the 
LAF (Lebanese Armed Forces)’s military equipment 
is attributed to a US veto, based on the concern that 
a strong Lebanese army would threaten Israel. It is 
exactly such a veto, in Hezbollah’s view, that justifies 
the necessity of the ‘resistance’:
What has the Lebanese State done to face 
potential perils that may occur in the region 
on the Israeli side?…Let’s start with the Army. 
Everybody wants a strong Army capable to 
defend the nation…What if we provide the 
Army with capabilities and strengths, which 
enable it to deter the enemy?...There is no 
answer…Yet, some in Lebanon prepared to 
confront all future Israeli threats…A part 
36 https://www.youtubecomwatch?v=cvNXVGOZYUI&t=
1030s.
37 https://www.youtubecomwatch?v=wHHnYwr2044.
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of the Lebanese people made it, namely the 
resistance. I do not mean only the resistance of 
Hezbollah…everyone who made an effort in 
this direction…After 30 years of accumulated 
experience… Lebanon today possesses this 
power. This power – the resistance with all its 
factions – defeated Israel [in 2006].38
In the same speech, Nasrallah goes on to talk about 
what he perceives as the new incumbent threat 
upon Lebanon: the takfiri threat. Here, he dismisses 
sectarianism whilst forging the image of the party as 
the protector of religious pluralism (al-ta’dudiyya):
Today those who are fighting in Syria are an 
extension to the…organization of the Islamic 
State in Iraq. Ask the Sunni in Iraq... They 
did not attack only Shi’ite mosques…and 
Christian churches. No!...Most of these suicide 
operations targeted Iraqis from all sects…Do 
you know what is the problem with the takfiri 
mentality? They label others as unbelievers for 
the most trivial reasons... whoever takes part 
in parliamentary elections is an unbeliever…
no matter whether he is a Sunni, a Shi’ite or a 
Christian…O Lebanese people!...I am a brother 
who gives you an advise...Lebanon will be 
afflicted by this epidemics. Let’s be logical. Put 
factionalism and sectarianism aside. This is a 
huge peril…We are not approaching the issue 
from a Shi’ite or Sunni perspective as some 
try to accuse us. We are rather approaching 
the issue from a perspective which sees both 
Muslims and Christians threatened in the 
same way39.
The discourse of Nasrallah marked a major change 
from the two previous years, when Hezbollah had 
denied the presence of its fighters on the Syrian 
front. From 2011 to 2013, Lebanese politics had been 
characterized by an exacerbation of the rivalry between 
the ‘14 March’ and the ‘8 March’ – the two blocs 
emerged from the political reshuffle that followed the 
end of the Syrian protectorate (al-wikala al-suriyya) in 
2005. When popular protests started to challenge the 
regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, in 2011, the ‘14 
38  Author’s translation.
39  Idem.
March’ sharply voiced its support to the Syrian street. 
The Hezbollah-led ‘8 March’, on the contrary, jumped 
on defending the legitimacy of Assad, mainly adopting 
Damascus’ narrative of a ‘foreign plot against Syria, 
masked as a popular revolution’.
The ‘14 March’, led by Sa’ad Hariri, hoped to witness 
a rapid regime change in Syria thus also an end of 
the long-standing influence that Assad exerted on 
Lebanon, despite the withdrawal of Syrian troops 
from the country in 200540. Relatedly, the ‘14 March’ 
expected that its main rival in Lebanon, Hezbollah, 
would be weakened and its armed wing dismantled. 
‘14 March’ politicians had, at different points in time, 
asked Hezbollah to put its weapons under the authority 
of the State and called for and supported international 
pressure on the Party. Hezbollah adopted a set of 
preventive measures to counteract rival attempts to 
marginalize the Party. In January 2011, three months 
before the Syrians sparked off street protests, Hezbollah 
ministers resigned from cabinet. As a consequence, the 
Hariri-led government collapsed. The move came as a 
response to Hariri’s backing of the UN Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL), which had signalled to hold proves 
of Hezbollah’s involvement in the assassination of Rafiq 
Hariri, Sa’d father, in 2005.41 A 6-month long political 
void opened up in Lebanon, until Nagib Mikati, a 
businessman from the northern city of Tripoli, was 
nominated Prime Minister. In July 2011, amidst the 
exacerbation of the Syrian regime repression and 
the transition from peaceful to violent mobilization 
of the Syrian protest, the STL issued an indictment 
against four Hezbollah members, to be executed by the 
Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF). Verbal anger 
escalated between the ‘14 March’ and the ‘8 March’, but 
the STL indictment was not eventually followed by any 
formal measure against the four Hezbollah members. 
Yet, the ‘14 March’ was still confident that Assad had 
his days counted, and a regime change in Damascus 
would have boosted the power of Hariri and allowed 
Saudi Arabia to exert more influence in Lebanon and 
the Arab Levant, thus to diminish the role of Iran and 
Hezbollah.
40 The withdrawal put an end to 29 years of Syrian military 
presence in Lebanon, widely considered as an ‘occupation’.
41  http://www.aljazeeracomnewsmiddleeast.
com/2011/01/2011112151356430829.html.
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The political polarization was only further exacerbated, 
however, since the conflict in Syria escalated and Assad 
showed surprising resilience. Lebanese citizens from 
the two camps joined the Syrian conflict on both sides, 
although Hezbollah’s capacities largely outnumbered 
those of their rivals. The turning point occurred in 
April 2013, when PM Mikati resigned from office 
and Tammam Salam was nominated as the new head 
of cabinet. Amidst this political turmoil, Hezbollah 
changed its strategy and decided to formally enter the 
Syrian conflict. The decision came at a moment in which 
the ’14 March’ was expecting a significant weakening 
of the SAA’s military force, whilst calling for Assad to 
step down. Not surprisingly, Hezbollah’s decision to 
enter Syria was enormously contested and criticized 
by the ‘14 March’ politicians and supporters. Salafi 
actors voiced their sympathy for the Syrian rebellion 
and mobilized against the Shi’a Party. For instance, 
the emergence of the ‘Abdullah Azzam’ Brigades and 
a group known as ‘Free Sunni Command’ in Ba’albek, 
an area of the Lebanese Biqa’ Valley mainly inhabited 
by Shi’ites and Christians, sparked panic amongst 
the population. Also, in Sunni-populated areas, such 
as Tripoli or Tareq Jadida in Beirut, sympathy for 
the Salafi jihadi group Jabhat al-Nusra (since 2016, 
renamed Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and Ha’yat Tahrir al-
Sham) enhanced sectarian hatred, which polarized the 
country even further. 
Hezbollah exploited these fears at a moment in which 
it was itself concerned with a possible fall of Bashar al-
Assad, which would have constructed a momentum of 
vulnerability for the Party, and encouraged its political 
rivals in Lebanon to raise the stake and undermine 
Hezbollah’s political future. Therefore, the Party 
decided to publically intervene in Syria. The decision 
not to keep a low profile in the al-Qusayr battle, but 
to flamboyantly display its force, has not just been a 
matter of necessity but rather a strategic move to deter 
its Lebanese rivals from escalating the rift in both Syria 
and Lebanon, and to freeze the status quo to produce 
more favourable conditions to politically renegotiate 
its role and viability. This strategic move can be only 
understood if we place Hezbollah’s violence in Syria in 
the wider picture of Hezbollah’s displays of force. 
Hezbollah’s search for 
legitimacy 
Hezbollah’s use of violence has been always controversial 
and contested by Lebanese and international 
actors, which have recurrently voiced for the Party’s 
disbandment and subjection to the authority of the 
Lebanese State. Yet, Hezbollah employs its weapons 
to mainly claim a political role and normalization, 
and to protect its position within the Lebanese power-
sharing system. This is the very logic of Hezbollah’s 
use and display of violence and continuation of its 
alliance with Iran and Syria. Accordingly, in order 
to resist marginalization, Hezbollah needs to create 
and reproduce legitimacy for its violence, amidst 
growing and renewing contestation of its military 
role in Lebanon. 42 The Party frames its action under 
the formula ‘al-jaysh, al-sha’ab, al-muqawama’ (‘the 
Army, the People, the Resistance’) that all Lebanese 
governments have adopted from 1992 to 2011. 
Not surprisingly, any possible change in the status 
quo, which is liable to undermine the validity of this 
formula, represents an opportunity for Hezbollah’s 
rivals to delegitimize the role of the ‘resistance’. In 
such critical moments, Hezbollah tends to display its 
violence in order to construct, adjust and force the 
other actors of the Lebanese power-sharing system 
to renegotiate a new domestic status quo. In order to 
understand the logic of Hezbollah’s display of force 
in Syria from 2013 onwards, we need to decode the 
Party’s perception of an incumbent challenge to its own 
survival, by placing Hezbollah’s public intervention in 
Syria along a series of momentous tensions between 
contesters and proponents of the legitimacy of the 
‘resistance’ Lebanon. 
In 1992, Hezbollah was mainly perceived as an 
“uninvited newcomer” in the Lebanese confessional 
power-sharing system, challenging all other members 
thereof, including the Shi’a party AMAL. At that time, 
however, Syria exploited Hezbollah’s military wing 
42  Marina Calculli, (Il)legitimate violence and the State 
in Lebanon. Understanding the liaison between Hezbollah 
and the Lebanese Army, paper presented at the George 
Washington University, 27 February 2016, https://www.
academia.edu/30200309/_Il_legitimate_violence_and_the_
State_understanding_the_liaison_between_Hezbollah_and_the_
Lebanese_Army.
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in southern Lebanon,43 whilst supporting AMAL 
and limiting Hezbollah’s participation in politics. A 
crucial moment of contestation of Hezbollah’s political 
role occurred when Israel withdrew from southern 
Lebanon, thus also encouraging Hezbollah’s rivals 
to claim that, with the end of occupation, the Party’s 
reason to exist had ended relatedly. After 9/11 2011, 
in the framework of the US war on terror, Hezbollah’s 
Lebanese rivals coordinated with international actors 
in order to enhance the pressure on the ‘resistance’, 
through the ‘Syrian Accountability Act and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Restoration Act’ (SALSRA) of 2003 and 
UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004), calling 
for the Party to submit its arms under the authority of 
the State. 
After the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and the end 
of Syrian military presence in the country in 2005, 
the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) was perceived as a further instrument to weaken 
Hezbollah. The 2006 war with Israel, de facto provoked 
by the Party, turned into a stunning opportunity for 
Hezbollah to renew the legitimacy of its weapons and 
their functionality for the security of Lebanon. The July 
war (harb tammuz) offered to the Party the narrative 
of a “victory”44, through which Hezbollah informed 
a new discourse to morally justify its violence. In 
Hezbollah’s view, the absence of military engagement 
of regular Arab armies against Israel – and especially 
the under-equipment of the Lebanese Army – was 
adequate to justify the continuation of Hezbollah’s 
armed resistance. The popularity of the Party spread in 
the whole Arab and Muslim world, giving the Party a 
moral allure and a deterrent towards its political rivals 
at once. 
A further occasion to delegitimize Hezbollah 
occurred in May 2008, when the government, led 
by the ‘14 March’ politician Fuad Seniora, outlawed 
the communication network of Hezbollah. The 
Party considered its communication network vital 
to counteract Israeli attacks against the Lebanese 
territories, and perceived the government’s decision as 
43  Syria used Hezbollah in south Lebanon in order to 
balance Israel. 
44  Although the war ended without winners or losers, 
Hezbollah claimed that its resistance prevented Israel from 
annexing part of Lebanon – as explicitly expressed by the Israeli 
government at the beginning of the war. 
a ‘declaration of war’. Therefore, it decided to occupy 
downtown Beirut, in a major demonstration of force, 
which proved Hezbollah’s military superiority. All this 
led anti-Hezbollah parties to make a step back and 
renegotiate the relationship between Hezbollah and the 
State in the 2008 Doha agreement, in which Hezbollah 
obtained that a Government decision should have the 
support of two-thirds of the cabinet, thus providing 
a grouping of ‘one-third plus one’ the power to veto. 
Such formal measure has been vital for Hezbollah to 
block decisions taken against the muqawama after 
200845. The new Cabinet that emerged from the Doha 
agreement recognized the formula al-jaysh, al-sh’ab, 
al-muqawama, thus reiterating the formal recognition 
of Hezbollah’s weapons within (and not outside) the 
framework of the State. 
Finally, when in 2013 Hezbollah officially entered 
Syria, the Party was obviously trying to prevent the 
fall of a major strategic ally, namely the Assad regime. 
Yet, the Party rhetorically framed its intervention as a 
preventive war against ‘terrorist groups’ and a way to 
protect Lebanon and the Lebanese border from takfiri 
infiltrations. The visibility of the collaboration between 
the Army and Hezbollah against Da’esh and other 
jihadi groups [especially around the jurd (outskirts) 
of the border-town ‘Arsal, in the northern part of the 
Biqa’ valley] is part and parcel of the Party’s strategy to 
refashion a moral justification for its military role in 
Lebanon.
In so doing, Hassan Nasrallah has emphasized 
the national role of Hezbollah, crafting a renewed 
doctrine of complementarity (al-takamul) between 
the muqawama and the Lebanese Army as the only 
formula to protect Lebanon from external threats. 46 
More crucially, this strategy has allowed the Party to 
reframe or strengthen a political alliance with Christian 
political parties and actors in Lebanon, against rival 
45  Including the aforementioned Hariri’s endorsement of 
the STL indictment against the party, which led to the government 
collapse in 2011.
46  Marina Calculli, (Il)legitimate violence and the State 
in Lebanon. Understanding the liaison between Hezbollah 
and the Lebanese Army, paper presented at the George 
Washington University, 27 February 2016, https://www.
academia.edu/30200309/_Il_legitimate_violence_and_the_
State_understanding_the_liaison_between_Hezbollah_and_the_
Lebanese_Army.
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Sunnis. Amongst them, there is especially the Leader 
of the Free Patriotic Movement, Michel ‘Aoun. The 
Free Patriotic Movement perceives Hezbollah’s action 
against Sunni jihadi groups as a defense of Christian 
existence and religious pluralism in the Arab Levant 
and of the Lebanese State more broadly. Their discourse 
has therefore refashioned the perception of Hezbollah 
amongst a great part of the Christian community in 
Lebanon. 
As stated in the previous section, Hezbollah capitalized 
on the political vacuum and stagnation that since 2011 
lingered over and exacerbated to the point that, when 
former President Michel Suleiman ended his mandate 
in 2014, the Parliament (that had itself illegitimately 
renewed its own mandate) was unable to elect a 
president. The Presidential vacuum finally ended 
in October 2016, with the election of Michel ‘Aoun, 
who openly supports the complementarity between 
Hezbollah and the Army and does consider Hezbollah 
as ‘part of the national defence of Lebanon’.47 By further 
associating itself to Christian conservative forces, 
Hezbollah has reinvented its security role for Lebanon 
in order to accommodate its interests within the new 
geopolitical conditions of the Arab Levant and the 
region, and continue to play a vital political role in 
Lebanon. 
Conclusions
Whereas the decision to intervene in Syria was certainly 
negotiated with Iran and Syria, in 2013 Hezbollah 
entered the conflict at its own terms and conditions. 
The Party has used the Syrian momentum in order to 
construct a novel discourse to justify the necessity of 
its weapons for Lebanon’s security. Such discourse was 
directed at both its Lebanese supporters and detractors, 
in order to reproduce, renegotiate and enhance its 
political role in the country. Therefore, Hezbollah has 
been able to improve its political position in Lebanon 
not simply in spite of its foreign adventurism in Syria, 
but precisely through it. 
The military action of the Party is informed by two 
inherent limitations: first, as a Lebanese actor and 
militia, the Party can potentially maximize its power 
47  http://yalibnan.com/2017/02/18/aoun-assures-critics-
that-hezbollah-would-be-bound-by-the-national-defense-
strategy/.
within Lebanon, whereas overstretching its regional 
ambitions is likely to be self-harming in the long 
run. Secondly, there exists an intimate link between 
Hezbollah’s military and political wings. More 
specifically, Hezbollah uses its weapons not only as a 
means to exert its political violence, but also as way to 
claim recognition as a political party. 
From this perspective, Hezbollah’s public display of 
force in Syria in 2013 was meant to deter its domestic 
political rivals from escalating the conflict against 
the resistance. By inscribing Hezbollah’s intervention 
in Syria within a series of cyclical demonstrations of 
force, this paper aimed at shedding light on the logic 
of Hezbollah’s violence, which serves to negotiate and 
secure its political viability in Lebanon, rather than 
expand its regional influence. 
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CONCLUSIONS
Ioannis Galariotis and Kostas Ifantis 
Six years after the start of the Syrian crisis, the future 
of the country is uncertain. There is no evidence that 
a viable solution will be found that produces a fair and 
peaceful settlement of the conflict. On the contrary, the 
continuation of chaos and bloodshed is more likely to 
be sustained. Hence, what went wrong and is there any 
hope for a peaceful settlement of the dispute? 
There are many reasons for the failure of efforts to deal 
with the Syrian crisis. In first place is the wider strategic 
environment and the realities in the Middle East that 
have to a great extent formed the course of events in 
the Syrian crisis. In Iraq, the withdrawal of US troops 
has provoked a fragile situation; Jordan, although it has 
effectively faced the wave of Arab transitions, has done so 
without seriously addressing some of the key economic 
and political challenges of the country. In Lebanon and 
Palestine, powerless governments and authorities are 
continually challenged; Egypt, one of the cornerstones 
of the once familiar architecture of regional security, 
has gone from autocracy, to constitutional theocracy 
and back to autocracy. Iran has not abandoned its 
nuclear aspirations, but it is gradually regarded as a 
useful ad hoc partner in countering the 2014 jihadist 
onslaught in Syria and Iraq. Turkey, the other critical 
underpinning of American post Second World War 
strategic planning, had its foreign policy under the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) contaminated 
by approaches with a strong sectarian flavor, blinded 
by doctrinal inflexibility and illusions of great power 
grandeur; thus, damaging its credibility in Washington 
and European, Eastern Mediterranean and Middle 
Eastern capitals. And, finally, in Syria, the civil war 
has claimed a death toll too high to contemplate and 
a refugee problem that no one has the courage to face, 
while the reappearance of Putin’s Russia, following the 
de facto annexation of Crimea, has raised the stakes.1
1 Khatib, L., Eaton, T., Haid, H., Hamidi, I., Kodmani, 
B., Phillips, C., Quilliam, N., and Sinjab, L. (2017) Western Policy 
Towards Syria: Applying Lessons Learnt, Chatham House, Middle 
East and North Africa Programme, March 2017, London. 
This e-book has attempted to give some answers 
to the questions raised by looking at the strategies 
of major international and regional powers in the 
Syrian civil war. One of the basic observations is that 
almost all powers grossly miscalculated the realities 
and evolutions in Syria as well as in the wider Middle 
East. First, the predictions were wrong about how long 
Assad would last and what he was capable of doing. 
Second, the international community, especially the 
US and Turkey, also miscalculated Assad’s isolation. 
Washington and Ankara truly believed that Assad’s 
supporters would only provide moral support and the 
West, under their leadership, would easily topple the 
regime. Yet, Iran turned out to be extremely generous 
when it came to providing military and economic 
support to Assad. Third, the arrival of new players in 
the dynamics of the conflict, such as Russia, further 
contributed to the endurance of the Assad regime and 
fundamentally altered the balance of power. Lastly, 
with the addition ISIS, the continuing conflict between 
the regime’s armed forces and the opposing rebels has 
become even more complex, with an explosive triangle 
of different hostile groups fighting each other.2  
Yet, there is more to it. The election of Donald Trump in 
the US will certainly change US foreign policy strategy 
in the Middle East and will determine a new approach 
toward the settlement of the Syrian crisis. It is not clear 
how Trump will deal with Russia, Turkey and other 
major powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iraq and 
Iran, regarding the Syrian conflict. What is clear is that 
the international community, under the auspices of 
the US, cannot appease the geopolitical storms in the 
Middle East, while regional powers, such as Turkey and/
or Russia—or anyone else for that matter—are not able 
to assume this role. It is certain that Syria has no good 
prospects. The struggle has revealed the deep divisions 
between Sunni, Alawite, Kurd and other smaller 
minority groups. The war has affected and threatens 
to gravely destabilize the fragile status quo in Lebanon 
and possibly elsewhere. Worse, it has accentuated the 
Sunni-Shiite antagonisms within the Islamic world and 
it has fueled the confrontation between extremists and 
2 Tomlinson, Lucas, “Old rivalries keeping Turkey on 
sidelines of Syria fight, analysts say”, Fox News, 16 October 2014, 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/10/16/old-rivalries-
keeping-turkey-on-sidelines-syria-fight-analysts-say/. 
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mainstream Islam across the Arab world.3 As one of 
the most well-known journalists to cover the Syrian 
conflict consistently over the last six years, Patrick 
Cockburn, famously put it at the beginning of the 
crisis: “Western intervention in Syria would make 
matters worse”.4 Future strategic developments will tell 
us whether Cockburn’s prediction is true or false. 
 
  
3  See Cordesman, Anthony, Syria: The Search for the 
Least Bad Option, CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy, 3 April 2013.
4  Cockburn, P. (2016) “Western Intervention in Syria 
would make Matters Worse”, 27 April 2011, in The Independent: 
Fisk, R., Cockburn, P. and K.Sengupta (2016) History as It 
Happened: Syria: Descent into the Abyss (Miami: Mango Media, 
The Independent), p.6. 
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